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Introduction
The relationship between international and municipal law is
complex and continually developing. One approach to analyze this
issue is to look at the interaction between domestic courts and the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). International courts can deal
with issues which may fairly fall under the jurisdiction of municipal
courts. Thus, courts from two different levels and legal systems may
entertain identical claims. The first question is whether there is any
kind of correlation between two types of courts, and if there is, what
is its character. If any connection exists, it exists either in a direct
interjudicial relationship, or in a more fragmentized relationship
involving other actors which link the two courts. This analysis will
primarily examine the attitudes of courts of the United States toward
the enforceability and legally binding character of I.C.J. decisions.
This article will also discuss the question of hierarchy between the
judicial decisions, and the questionable power of municipal courts to
examine the validity and substance of international decisions.
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In the proceedings leading to Breardv. Greene,' both U.S. courts
and the I.C.J. dealt with the same issue-the violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. This case has shown the
relevance of lis pendens and the need for a more defined relationship
between international and domestic courts. By ignoring the existence
of the proceeding before the I.C.J. and its decision directed to the
United States and its courts, U.S. courts undermined the authority of
the World Court and brought into question U.S. determination to
comply with international law.
The temporal connection between the cases in the two courts
stressed the problem of the relationship between international and
municipal courts. Each court discussed interdependent issues, and
each reached an opposite decision. A provisional measures order of
the I.C.J. was directed to the matter pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court refused to comply with the interlocutory
decision of the I.C.J., opening the question of the addressee of
international decisions in general, and of this order in particular. The
consequences were detrimental. The disagreement resulted in the
execution of a death sentence and a violation of international law.
Because of the U.S. Supreme Court decision, the main
proceeding before the I.C.J., Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para.v. U.S.), 2 was discontinued and the World Court did
not reach a judgment on the merits. Otherwise, the I.C.J. would
probably have indicated more precisely the character of the
relationship between municipal and international courts from the
international law perspective. However, one may try to discover the
nature of this relationship from indirect references in international
jurisprudence, regulations and theory.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to give direct effect to the
decision of the International Court of Justice. One can try to trace
the reasons for this decision and its possible consequences on
international law. It is also possible to take the opposite point of view
and determine if there were some other ways the U.S. Supreme Court
could have respected the I.C.J. decision without violating U.S. law.
The significance of this is even greater as Breard was the first death

1. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
2. On April 3, 1998, Paraguay brought a case against the United States and
requested the indication of provisional measures. 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9). The case
was removed from the list on November 10, 1998 in accordance with Paraguay's
request for discontinuing the proceeding. 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 11).
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penalty case to reach the World Court3 Breard announced a new
type of international case. It was followed by the LaGrand case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.)4 which also showed an acute, methodical
unwillingness to comply with both the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) and I.C.J. decisions. These
decisions also revealed a pattern of systematic violations of the
Consular Convention in the United States, confirmed by United States
v. Lombera-Camorlinga'
The issues in Breardcan be placed in a larger framework in order
to illustrate the intersection of the international and domestic legal
orders and their complexity. These issues are the obligation of
municipal courts to take into account I.C.J. decisions; state
responsibility for the acts of its courts; the interpretative methods of
the U.S. courts and the I.C.J.; methods for enforcing I.C.J. decisions,
including the question of general international law enforceability; the
effect of the decisions of municipal courts on I.C.J. proceedings and
international law; the potency of domestic doctrines for international
law implementation and its application in this case; human rights
considerations in the horizontally structured international system; the
validity of domestic legal arguments before the I.C.J. and vice versa;
and the ways to reconcile conflicting attitudes and enable full
compliance with international law.
This article argues that there were other possible solutions for
Breard and that various international and domestic legal arguments
could have been employed to reach a less damaging outcome. The
first part of this article will focus on the international and U.S. law
perspectives on the validity and enforcement of I.C.J. decisions,
particularly provisional measures orders. The second part will
analyze U.S. constitutional arguments, so that the search for another
solution can focus exclusively on domestic grounds and avoid
3. See Peter Bekker & Keith Highet, InternationalCourt of Justice Orders U.S.
to Stay Execution of ParaguayanNational in Virginia, NAT'L B. A'SSN. MAG., Apr.
12, 1998, at 37.
4. Germany instituted proceedings against the United States for the alleged
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on March 2, 1999. The
I.C.J. issued a Provisional Measure on March 3, 1999, obliging the United States to
do what it was supposed to do in the Breardmatter-stay the execution. 1999 I.C.J. 9
(Mar. 3).
5. 170 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999); see generally Court Upholds Rights of Foreign
Defendants to ConsularAdvice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 37 ("'Hopefully, [this
case will] end a systematic violation of the treaty that's been going on for 30 or 35
years,' Mr. Coleman [the public defender in this case] said.").
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international law counter arguments. The U.S. legal system offers
many possible resolutions for this type of case, with the executive
branch being a key factor. The third part argues that human rights
perspectives should not have been excluded in the U.S. courts as they
offer very strong and enforceable arguments. The fourth part
introduces the concept of comity as a potent and useful argument in
cases that raise international concerns. Finally, the fifth part is
devoted to the character and inconsistency of the legal arguments
used in Breard, and argues that their compatibility could have been
achieved for different policy reasons, with the outcome beneficial for
all actors in this drama.
A. The Breard Case
Angel Francisco Breard was a 32-year-old citizen of Paraguay
who had come to the United States in 1986. In 1993, a Virginia jury
convicted Breard of the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth
Dickie. The State of Virginia scheduled the execution of Breard for
9:00 p.m. on April 14, 1998. On April 3, 1998, Paraguay filed an
application with the I.C.J. Registry alleging violations by the United
States of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.6
These violations stemmed from the failure by the Commonwealth of
Virginia to advise Breard of his right to communication with, and
receive assistance from, the consular officers of Paraguay, as required
by Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.7 Paraguay submitted a
request for a provisional measures order seeking the re-establishment
of the status-quo-ante situation that existed before the United States
violated international law by not providing the notification with
respect to the consular service as required by the Vienna
Convention.8
At Breard's trial in 1993, the prosecution presented potent
6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261. Paraguay's accession became effective on December 23, 1969; the
United States signed the Convention on April 24, 1963 and ratified it effective
November 24, 1969.
7. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that a detained foreign national
must be informed of his right to communicate with consular officials and grants
consular officials the right to visit with a detained national and to arrange for his legal
representation. Id.
8. After filing its application on April 3, 1998, Paraguay also submitted on the
same day an urgent request for the indication of provisional measures in order to
protect its rights. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9).
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evidence of guilt. Furthermore, Breard admitted guilt. The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed Breard's convictions and sentences and the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Virginia courts later
denied Breard collateral relief. In August, 1996, Breard sought
federal habeas corpus relief. In his petition to the federal court, he
claimed that the sentence and convictions should be overturned as
they violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. He
alleged, for the first time since the proceedings started in 1993, that
the U.S. authorities had failed to notify him that, as a foreign citizen,
the Convention afforded him the right to contact the Paraguayan
Consulate. The district court denied relief, concluding that Breard
had procedurally defaulted on this claim when he failed to bring it up
in state court and that he could not show "cause and prejudice" for
this default, as required by law. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Breard then sought certiorari from
the U.S. Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Paraguay sought relief for the
violation of the Vienna Convention by suing various Virginia officials
in federal district court, claiming that their actions violated
Paraguay's contractual rights under the treaty. The Consul General
also raised a parallel section 1983 claim alleging a denial of his rights
under the Convention. The district court dismissed the case on the
grounds that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over these suits
because Paraguay was not alleging a "continuing violation of federal
law" and could not bring itself within an exception to Virginia's
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Paraguay also sought a
writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, Paraguay instituted proceedings before the I.C.J.,"
which ordered provisional measures asking the United States to "take
9. See Breard v. Pruett,134 F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 1998).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables ambassadors and consuls to have a cause of action
for the violation of an international treaty, in this case the Paraguay-U.S. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, if they assert their own rights, or rights of
their country, which must be different from the right already decided by the court
(here, their rights were different from the rights of Breard). The district court held
that Paraguay and its officials had standing to bring their claims under the

Convention.
11. This proceeding was instituted by Paraguay's application on April 3, 1998, but
was discontinued and removed from the court's list on November 10, 1998, due to
Paraguay's withdrawal from the proceeding. See 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10) (Order of
10 November 1998, Discontinuance by the Republic of Paraguay of the Proceedings
Instituted by the Application Filed on April 3, 1998).

1999]

The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions

all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is
not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings."
Breard then sought an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay
of execution from the U.S. Supreme Court. Paraguay petitioned to
file an original action in that Court as a case affecting foreign consuls.
The U.S. Departments of Justice and State informed the Supreme
Court that provisional measures orders are not binding under
international law, and urged the Court to deny any legal effect of the
I.C.J.'s decision. On April 14, the Supreme Court denied the petition
for habeas corpus and both petitions for certiorari. In doing so, the
Supreme Court did not admit the legal effect of an I.C.J. decision
before the U.S. municipal courts. On April 13, the Secretary of State
had sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia asking him to stay the
execution. This request was refused, and Breard was executed on
April 14, 1999.
It is necessary to note that the order Paraguay requested from
the Supreme Court related only to a suspension of the execution
while the proceeding before the I.C.J. was pending. Paraguay sought
the restoration of the situation before Virginia violated the Vienna
Convention, which can be described as a request for restitutio in
integrum. In addition, the request could be expanded to reparations
for the alleged violation of the international treaty. The scope of the
order may be seen as a demand for the temporary suspension of the
execution while the I.C.J. concluded its proceedings on the merits. In
any case, neither the order nor the fact that there was a proceeding
pending was directed towards the criminal responsibility of Breard.
The I.C.J. documents concerning provisional measures were not
aimed at the12 substantive administration of criminal justice regulated
by U.S. law.
B. The Legal Issues Raised by the U.S. Supreme Court in Breard
Paraguay's diplomatic interventions and attempts to seek relief
in the U.S. courts raised important international law questions. 3 This
case certainly involved the problems of the conduct of foreign affairs

12. "At the same time, the Court made it clear that the case does not concern the

right of... states to resort to the death penalty and that the Court's function is to
resolve international legal disputes between sovereign states and not to act as a
universal supreme court of criminal appeals." Bekker & Highet, supra note 3, at 38.

13. See Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1357 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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and compliance with treaty obligations arising from the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. It seems that the international
legal norms stemming from the Vienna Convention were not the only
norms of that character that were at stake. Furthermore, this was not
even the only treaty to be breached since Virginia may also have
violated the U.N. Charter and I.C.J. Statute. This case also raised
other issues, including the legal validity of I.C.J. decisions in U.S.

courts, the interpretation of treaties and customary international law,
the treatment of the separation of powers and federalism within the
U.S. legal system when dealing with foreign affairs issues, and the
protection of international human rights in U.S. courts. Public
opinion on both the national and international levels is a separate
issue here. Also, the humanitarian aspects relating to the execution
of this death sentence, in the environment of the challenged legality
of its enforcement, contributed to the importance of this situation.
Thus, the Breard decision raised numerous independent international
issues.
I. The Arguments Pertaining to the Binding Force of ICJ
Decisions and the Consequences of Non-Compliance
In order to argue that international decisions are enforceable in
national legal systems, one must first prove that a particular decision
is binding in the system from which it comes. As the violation of the
Vienna Convention initiated the proceeding before the I.C.J.,
Paraguay's and Breard's allegations in U.S. courts were put in an
international legal framework.
This is how the issue gained different dimensions on the
international plane with possible domestic effects. The reverse is also
true, as the I.C.J.'s entry of interim measures decisively changed the
legal situation with regard to the pending domestic proceeding. First,
the implications are not restricted to Paraguay and the United States
alone as the I.C.J. was involved. Second, the issue was clear cut as the
problem was shifted from treaty implementation to court compliance
with an international decision. The I.C.J.'s intervention interrupted
the exclusively bilateral and reciprocal legal relationship between the
United States and Paraguay. This might be viewed as a new form of
bilateral relationship between the I.C.J. and the state in question.
Even more, as the I.C.J. speaks on behalf of the international
community and international legal order, the relationship between
the parties becomes more complex, giving it a bilateral-multilateral
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character. However, it is important to note that the Supreme Court
referred to the pending case before the I.C.J. as an irrelevant fact,
only mentioning the existence of the order without further comment.
Beginning on April 9, 1998," the international issue became
more specific and amounted to whether U.S. courts were obliged to
respect this order. Because the Supreme Court refused to give legal
effect to the I.C.J. order on provisional measures with respect to the
pending proceeding before the I.C.J., the subject matter of which was
directly connected with Breard,I shall first examine the legal validity
of this order, from both an international and U.S. perspective.
A. The InternationalLaw Perspective
Provisional measures are envisaged in Article 41 of the Statute of
the I.C.J.5 and in Articles 73-78 of the Rules of the Court. 6 These
articles give the court power to prescribe measures that need to be
taken in order to preserve the rights of either party. Such judicial
power is not a sui generis characteristic of the World Court, as it
originates in domestic legal systems.'
The main purpose for provisional measures is to preserve the
rights which are the subject matter of the dispute before the I.C.J. in
order not to make the complete procedure meaningless before it is
ended." But there are other important goals and functions of the
provisional measures. One function is to give a correct and adequate

14. This was the date when the I.C.J. entered the order on provisional measures
that indicated the obligation of the United States to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard not be executed, pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and to inform the court of all the measures which it was supposed
to take in implementation of the order. See 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9).
15. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1 U.N.T.S. at xvi.
("The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.").
16. 1978 Rules of the Court. The 1946 and 1972 Rules referred to the provisional
measures as "interim measures of protection." The revision of the Court Rules in
1972 brought the terminology of the Statute and Rules into line. Interim Protection,
1978 I.C.J. Rules of the Court, arts. 73-78.
17. See Rosenne Shabtai, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS
96 (1995) ("This enables the Court to take steps roughly corresponding to an interim
injunction which domestic courts are frequently empowered to issue pending the final
determination.").
18. See H.W.A. Thirlway, The Indication of Provisional Measures by the
InternationalCourt of Justice, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 7-8, (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Springer Verlag 1994).
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response to an urgent situation which may be a threat to the
international rights of states and the proceedings before the I.C.J.
Another function is to prevent irreparable damage. The provisional
measures are also designed to prevent the extension of a dispute and
the preservation of evidence19 . The I.C.J. has been very clear in
interpreting Article 47, explaining the nature and functions of the
provisional measures:
Whereas the right of the Court to indicate provisional measures as
provided for in Article 41 of the Statue has as its object to preserve
the respective rights of the Parties pending the decision of the
Court, and presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be
caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial
proceedings, and that the Court's judgment should not be
anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the measures
which are in issue .... 20
The following pronouncement is to similar effect:
Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statue of the Court has as its object to
preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the decision of
the Court, and presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be
caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial
proceedings .....
A provisional measures order is an interlocutory decision which
cannot prejudice the final outcome of the case;n the decision on
substantive questions is reserved for the final judgment on the merits.
The interlocutory character of the provisional measures order does
not deprive it of its judicial character and corresponding attributes of
other I.C.J. decisions. Therefore, a provisional measures order can be
viewed either as an I.C.J. order distinct from other I.C.J. decisions, or
as an order which fairly falls in the category of judicial decisions and

19. See id. at 8-16.
20. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1972 I.C.J. 16,34.
21. Passage through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12 (July 29).
22. See 1973 I.C.J. 123, 158 appended to Order of June 22, 1973 (dissenting
opinion of Gros, J.) ("Here we have a condition of general scope for the
interpretation of Article 41 of the Statue of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, which was identical to the present Article 41, and the recognition of a

procedural requirement operating in regard to interlocutory jurisdiction. For it
would indeed, by a definition, be contrary to the nature of interlocutory proceedings
if they enabled the dispute of which they were only an accessory element to be
disposed of.").
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acquires all characteristics prescribed for them by the U.N. Charter,
I.C.J. Statute, and Rules of the Court.
The general issue is to what extent provisional measures are
binding on the state to which they are directed. International law
theory supports the notion that the orders are binding. ' Differences
that arise stem from different concepts of such validity and further
entail the character of the state's obligation. There are two possible
approaches, as mentioned above: (1) An order is binding as a matter
of treaty law; or (2) Its binding character stems from general
international law.
1. OrdersAre Binding as a Matter of Treaty Law
The Statute of the I.C.J. is a multilateral treaty that gives the
court power to articulate binding measures. Under this approach, the
order can be viewed as the result of a two-step procedure regulated
by the Statute. First, parties to the treaty consented to the Statute.
Although not all states ratified the Convention, it still represents an
authoritative source and many countries refer to it as evidence of
customary treaty law 24. By consenting to a treaty, a state becomes
bound by all provisions envisaged in it. Consent invests a treaty with
legal force limiting the parties' sovereignty to the extent they find
suitable, and in a manner consistent with international law. Treaties
have to be respected in order to honor the will of the states. If the
will of a state changes, the state may withdraw from the treaty.' The
I.C.J. Statute, as a multilateral treaty, gives the court the power to
indicate provisional measures under certain circumstances. When
such circumstances arise, the I.C.J. is expected to act accordingly.
23. See Thirlway, supra note 18, at 29.
24. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
"accepts the Vienna Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the
customary international law governing international agreements." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW PT. III Intro. Note (1986).
25. It might not be difficult to advocate the approach by which state consent may
not exist at the time of an undesirable proceeding. Having such a dilemma, we may
find ourselves addressing the question of the nature of international law. In order to
preserve its legal character and to be distinguished from morality and politics, it must
meet two conditions: normativity and concreteness. "To show that an international
law exists, with some degree of reality, the modem lawyer needs to show that the law
is simultaneously normative and concrete-that it binds a State regardless of that
State's behavior, will or interest but that its content can nevertheless be verified by
reference to actual State behavior, will or interest."

Koskenniemi Martti, From

Apology to Utopia: The Structure of InternationalLegal Argument, LAKIMIESLIITON
KUSTANNUS (Helsinki 1989), at 2.
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As a party to the I.C.J. Statute and the U.N. Charter, the United
States must comply with an I.C.J. order. The order on provisional

measures in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in the opinion of S. 0. Ajibola,
supports this assertion:
At this point, it is important to state the provision of Article 94 of
the Charter, which reads:
Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party.
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligation incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if
it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.26
The word "decision" in Article 94 of the U.N. Charter embraces
all decisions entered by the court, including interlocutory decisions
such as an order on provisional measures.27 The purpose of Article 94
was clearly to uphold the authority of the I.C.J. in the full exercise of
its competence.' Since an order is not a judgment, it cannot attract
the effect of res judicata as is envisaged in Article 59 of the I.C.J.
Statute. The decision of the court can be seen as a valid treaty
obligation. Under this theory,
the reception of the judgment is already preceded by the reception
of a rule of international law, namely Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
and Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, so that the reception of the
international judgment is founded on the reception of international
law which has taken place earlier. 29
Moreover, other reasons exist for respecting orders with some
reference to the legal effect of the court's final judgments. Most
importantly, the order deals with an incidental question that will not
26. 1993 I.C.J. 401 (emphasis added).
27. "It seems that the word 'decision' in the Charter refers to all decisions of the
Court, regardless of their form." SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 125 (1965).
28. See Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution of Angel Breard by the United
States: Violating an Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 121,127 (1998).
29. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by National Courts of Decisions of
InternationalTribunals,28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 45, 52 (1996).
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influence the final outcome of the case. This circumstance, however,

does not deprive it of the authority of a judicial decision. Shabtai
Rosenne explains this connection as follows:
In practice the consequences of conduct of this nature may be
virtually indistinguishable for a res judicata. The effect of the noncreation of a res judicata is simply that the substantive rights of the
parties are unaffected by the order, save to the extent that where
the Court relied on certain facts stated to it by one or both parties,
the conduct of that party may debar it from denying its statements
in a later stage.30

This interpretation may help to distinguish the authority of the
Court's decisions, depending on whether they stem from form or
substance. The substance of the provisional measures order poses
little danger to states because it can influence neither the question of
state responsibility nor the substantive legal issues, whatever its
specific direction may be. Nevertheless, the issuance of an order may
form the grounds for responsibility pro futuro if it is not complied
with. Therefore, compliance with a provisional measure order cannot
harm states; it simply serves to effect the proper administration of
international justice.31
One may therefore conclude that the conception of states as

parties to an international treaty supports the binding character of
provisional measures orders.32 Several articles are implicated:
Articles 25,3 94,' and 103"5 of the U.N. Charter, and Articles 30, 38,
30. 2

SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE 632 (2d ed. 1985).

31. The problem that may arise here is the fact that non-compliance with a
provisional measures order does not induce either sanctions or procedural
disadvantages (as it does in cases of, e.g., non-appearance). One may dispute the
binding character of provisional measures order due to the absence of sanctions.
Nevertheless, this argument is valid only if the Austinian model of law is accepted as
authoritative, valid and possible.
32. Thirlway strongly advocates this approach as the only possible one if
provisional measures orders are to be seen as binding. See Thirlway, supra note 18,
at 1-36.
33. "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decision of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N.
CHARTER art.

25.

34. See supra note 21.
35. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
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41 and 59 of the I.C.J. Statute.36
2.

OrdersAre Binding Under GeneralInternationalLaw

General international law gives legal effect to I.C.J. orders as
binding on states. Consensus holds that the sources of international
law are mainly embraced in Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute. 7 When
considered together with international treaties, this means that
customary international law and general principles of law may be
considered. Some authors have specified the particular source they
consider to be the ground for provisional measures, but frequently
authors refer only to general international law without making this
distinction. J.B. Elkind provides a good example of this first
approach:
It is the central theme of this book that the power to indicate
interim measures is "a general principle of law recognized by
civilized nations" and that it is hence a principle of general
international law under Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute. As such
a
8
principle, interim measures indicated by the Court are bindingY
On the other hand, some authors find customary international
law to be a more appropriate basis for supporting the binding
character of I.C.J. decisions.39 Nevertheless, others find those
distinctions irrelevant, citing only general international law as
grounds for the binding effect of provisional measures. Examples
from the jurisprudence of the I.C.J. support this:
[T]he binding nature of an order is inherent in itself. It imposes a
positive obligation recognized by international law. Whether such
an order is complied with or not, whether it can be enforced or not,
what other sanctions lie behind it-all these are external questions,
not affecting the internal question of inherent validity. 4°
Similarly:
36. There are also corresponding articles of the I.C.J. Rules (Articles 73 through
78), but they largely concern the technical and procedural aspects of provisional
measures. The I.C.J. has the power to enact the rules of procedure under Article 30
of the I.C.J. Statute (pertaining to incidental jurisdiction).
37. See, e.g., M.

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

58 (2d ed. 1986);

2 (1966);

BROWNLIE,

HUDSON, THE PERMANENT

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 601 (1934).
38. B. JEROME, INTERIM PROTECTION: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 162 (1981).

39. See, e.g., Rosenne, supra note 27, at 127.
40. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1993 I.C.J. 374 (Weeramantry, J.) [hereinafter Weeramantry].
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The Court, as I would further point out, has this power under the
Statute and Rules, so that it also forms a part of its inherent power
under general international law. Otherwise it may be impeded
from functioning as a Court.41

Some authors consider the incidental jurisdiction of the Court to
issue provisional measures, as well as the legal effect of such an order,
as an inherent characteristic to all institutions performing judicial
functions. 2
Putting aside for a moment the general question of the legal
validity of provisional measures orders, other, more specific questions
must be addressed. The first question relates to the fact that
international legal theory and practice, to a certain extent, distinguish
between the binding force and enforceability of provisional measures.
"Confusion has arisen in legal writings on the issues of enforceability
and the binding character of provisional measures. These two
problems must be treated separately, since it is possible that the
measures can be binding without being enforceable."43
This may help illuminate the transition of international
prescription into municipal legal systems.' I.C.J. jurisprudence is
helpful in that respect as well:
As the lack of mechanisms for enforceability sometimes clouds
discussions of the binding nature of the orders of this Court, a
consideration of the binding nature of provisional measures must
start with the clear distinction that exists between the question of
the legal obligation to comply with an order and the question of its
enforcement. The fact that an order cannot be enforced does not in
any manner affect its binding nature, for the binding nature of an
41. Id. at 406 (Ajibola, J.).
42. See, e.g., Rosenne, supra note 27, at 427 ("There is sometimes said to exist a
generally recognized principle according to which the institution of judicial
proceedings itself operates as a provisional measure of protection, since the parties
are under an implied obligation, until the Court has reached its decision in the case,
to refrain from any steps which might have a prejudicial effect on the execution of the
Court's final decision, or which might exacerbate the dispute.").
43. E.Hellbeck, ProvisionalMeasures of the InternationalCourt of Justice-Are
They Binding?, 9 ASILS INT'L L.J. 169, 176 (1985).
44. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by National Courts of Decisions of
InternationalTribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 45, 56 (1995-1996) ("It should
be added that the foregoing analysis has the advantage of enabling a distinction to be
drawn more readily between the enforcement of an judicial decision and its
reception. Enforcement signifies the implementation of the judicial decision as an
instrumentum, i.e., in terms of its formal entirety. The reception we are talking of
looks at the judicial decision as a negotium, i.e., in terms of its substantive content.").
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order is inherent in itself.4
Weeramantry continues:
When this Court, duly acting within its authority and jurisdiction,
indicates provisional measures, it is in the expectation that those
measures will be complied with, in accordance with international
law. Their violation must therefore be viewed with great concern.
The question of the obligation to comply must at all4 6times be
sharply distinguished from the question of enforceability.

This distinction appears to settle the matter in two opposite
directions-international decisions have binding force in the
international sphere, but enforcement of the decisions takes place
outside of the international sphere. Nevertheless, these two different
features may complement each other. Moreover, this distinction
explains the structure of the international legal system and offers
possible solutions for the enforcement of international law. As a
result, another question hidden in this conundrum might be
answered. The decision is directed to a respondent state as an
indivisible entity from the international law enforcement standpoint.
The court may choose to address the responsible branch of
government or to leave this to the state to decide. Considering the
aforementioned distinction between binding force and enforceability,
it seems that the court communicates with a state on the level of
international relations, an appropriate method for two international
entities. The court prescribes an "assignment" to a state as legally
binding; the state decides how to enforce the particular I.C.J.
decision.
The second question relates to the determination of the
character, scope, and extent of a state's obligation when it is an
addressee of provisional measures orders. This depends on the
concrete language and how it can change the general obligation to
comply with I.C.J. orders. The character of the obligation outlined in
the order is not irrelevant. Obligations are different for, on the one
hand, generally formulated decisions that amount to undertakings of
certain activities regardless of their outcome, 47 and, on the other hand,
45. Weeramantry, supra note 40, at 374.
46. Id. at 375.
47. See U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J.
21 ("The Government of the Unites States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran should not take any action and should ensure that no action
is taken which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the

1999]

The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions

precise and direct decisions.4 In the latter case, the way in which the
compliance with international law is supposed to be achieved is clear.
The third question concerns the overwhelming non-compliance
with provisional measures and the danger that this may affect
arguments for their legally binding character. One may illustrate this
dilemma by the following statement: "Furthermore, the Vienna
Convention recognizes the relevance of State practice in
interpretation, just as much as that of the effet utile. 49 A strong
argument may be made that interim measures are binding.
3. Provisional Measures, Order of April 9, 1998, Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.)
The I.C.J. unanimously decided to grant provisional measures as
Paraguay had requested, having found that the conditions for
indicating provisional measures were fulfilled. What must be stressed
at the beginning is the difference between the substantive elements of
the case as a whole and the provisional measures of the I.C.J. The
scope and extent of this order was limited to (a) the prevention of the
execution of Angel Francisco Breard pending the final decision in the
proceeding before the I.C.J., and (b) the obligation of the United
States to inform the court of all measures taken in implementing the
order. Although Paraguay emphasized the importance of some
aspects of the case at this stage, it was more a review of the previous
proceeding; the court could not have taken them as arguments due to

existing dispute more difficult of solution."); see also Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 186-87 (May 10) (containting the complete
operative part of the order); 1993 I.C.J. 24 52(A)(1) ("The Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in
pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to
prevent commission of the crime of genocide.").
48. See 1979 I.C.J. 21 § A. In Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations (Para.v.
U.S.), the court ordered
(a) That the Government of the United States take the measures necessary
to ensure that Mr. Breard not be executed pending the disposition of this
case; [and]
(b) That the Government of the United States report to the Court the
actions it has taken in pursuance of subparagraph (a) immediately above and
the results of those actions.
1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9).
49. Thirlway, supra note 18, at 151.
50. This opinion holds, so the argument goes, despite assertions that state
practice does not support it.
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their substantive legal character, save for jurisdictional purposes.51
What is particularly important for this case is the clarity with
which the obligation is defined in the operative part of the order.
Unlike many other cases, in which the language used has tended to be
general, here the obligation was very clear in two respects. It referred
only to one person who was under the jurisdiction of the defendant
state, and the obligation amounted to one specific action-suspension
of the execution. Such singularity in the operative part of the court's
decision on provisional measures had no precedent. There were no
alternative steps that could have outweighed the primary obligation;
the "appropriateness" of these measures was not left up to the state.
Furthermore, very often the court's ruling has been directed to both
parties to restrain them from aggravating the dispute, but such was
not the case here.
The language used by the court was specific and clear, avoiding
general terms and model-phrases that are often employed in such
orders. One may well think that the order could not have been
construed more precisely and more narrowly. The request put
forward by Paraguay was very clear and direct, trying to avoid the
possible trap of condemning substantive aspects of the case. The
more precise a request is, the more precise and concrete the counterargument must be to be effective. Paraguay's request wisely departed
from general implications about the U.S. internal system' 4 focusing
51. The applicant was obliged to demonstrate its prima facie case.
52. See, e.g., U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979
I.C.J. 20 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 15); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 186 (Provisional
Measures Order of May 10); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 24
(Provisional Measures Order).
53. See, e.g., U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979
I.C.J. 20,20-21 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec. 15).
54. As Mr. Donovan, one of the Paraguayan agents in this case, stated,
The Court has also stated that provisional measures should not "anticipate"
the Court's judgment on the merits. As an initial matter, I should note that
the relief that Paraguay seeks on the merits in this case is carefully
restrained.... Likewise, the provisional measures that Paraguay seeks are
carefully limited and in no way anticipate a judgment. Paraguay does not
ask, for example, that Mr. Breard be afforded a new trial at this time, or that
his conviction and sentence be in any way affected except that the death
sentence-the execution-be provisionally suspended. Mr. Breard will
remain in custody, and if the United States prevails on the merits in this
case, Virginia will be able to go forward with the execution. Thus, the
United States can complain of no harm if the Court orders the narrowly
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itself on the international aspect of this particular case.' On the other
hand, arguments proposed by the United States were trying to
characterize the issue more generally. Also, the arguments used by
the U.S. were more of an internal legal character, quite the opposite
to the arguments used by Paraguay. 6 Those arguments were based
on the specifics of the internal judicial system, including the
separation of powers between governmental branches in the U.S.
system; the possibility that the I.C.J. could become a universal
supreme court of criminal appeals; the notion that Paraguay was
requesting restoration of the status quo ante (which was not the
request at this stage of the proceeding, but a part of the application
reserved for the merits); and the fact that Mr. Breard had admitted

his guilt (which Paraguay did not dispute).

However, the most

important point could not have been argued-that the international
treaty had been breached and that the United States admitted that it

had. 7
Each party tried to focus on a different aspect of the case in
order to present its strongest arguments. The court entered its

tailored provisional measures that Paraguay seeks.
Donovan, Public Sitting on the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
Apr. 7,
1998, Verbatim
Record,
available at <http://www.I.C.J.cij.org/I.C.J.www/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm>.
55. Mr. Donovan noted,
The crimes with which Mr. Breard is charged deserve the most unequivocal
condemnation. On the present state of affairs, individual states of the
United States have the authority to express that condemnation in the form
of the penalty of death. But even if the death penalty may still be lawfully
imposed as a matter of sanction, courts entrusted to uphold the rule of lawon the international level no less than on the municipal level-must be
vigilant to ensure the lawfulness, too, of the proceedings by which that
penalty is imposed. To exercise that vigilance here, the Court must first
indicate to the United States that it must ensure that Paraguay's national is
not executed while this case is before the Court.
Id.
56. "[The] Government of the United States ... emphasized inter alia that a stay
of execution depended exclusively on the United States Supreme Court and the
Governor of Virginia." Order para. 19. "[T]he United States ... alleged that the
indication of the provisional measures requested.., would in particular be such as
seriously to disrupt the criminal justice systems of the State parties to the
Convention, given the risk of proliferation of cases ... ." Id. at para. 22.
57. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), <http://www.I.C.J.cij.org/I.C.J.www/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm> (separate declaration of President
Schwebel) ("There is an admitted failure by the Commonwealth of Virginia to have
afforded Paraguay consular access, that is to say, there is an admitted breach of
treaty.").
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decision in favor of Paraguay, charging the United States with a very
specific obligation while leaving it no alternative choice for its
fulfillment. The obligation of the Unites States to suspend the
execution was beyond any doubt.
4.

The Reasonsfor the "Double"Justificationof the Legally
Binding Characterof ProvisionalMeasures Orders

One may find it unnecessary, illogical and superfluous to provide
alternative grounds supporting the notion that provisional measures
are legally binding. Nevertheless, the international character of the
International Court of Justice, which enacts such orders and other
judicial decisions, has to be considered. It was apparent from the
beginning that orders would be sent to states with different legal and
political systems. The court's jurisprudence and international legal
theory tried not to close off different possible methods for the legal
acceptance of its decisions. Unfortunately, the court's decisions are
well known for lack of enforcement. If international lawyers and
institutions step back every time there is the possibility of fortifying
the system, there will be no chance for its development.
This article has argued that either ground could serve as a legal
and legitimate basis to make provisional measures orders binding.
Each option provides different opportunities for municipal courts to
take international law seriously. If two alternatives are offered, it is
less likely that municipal legal systems will refuse to give effect to
I.C.J. orders, especially if interpretations are given by an authoritative
institution.58
I will next examine whether these international legal grounds
could have been used to give effect to the I.C.J. order in the U.S. legal
system. I will also discuss U.S. legal doctrines and arguments that
might have enabled the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize the I.C.J.
decision in Breard.

58. The effect of I.C.J. decisions in national courts and their reception by them

represent a vast and complex aspect of international law. See generally S. Ordonez &
D. Reilly, Effect of the Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justice on National
Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 335-72 (T. M.
Franck & G. H. Fox eds., 1996); Bedjaoui, supra note 44; B. CONFRONTI,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (1993); C.C.
SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS

(1980);
(1993).

L. ERADES, INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW
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B. The U.S. Law Perspective
The U.S. legal system has developed different mechanisms for
Although it corresponds to the
receiving international law. 9
law,
there are some features which are
requirements of international

unique to the United States. However, one may find the rationale for
this original approach to international law in the doctrine of dualism
(well established in the U.S. legal system) and in the constant need to
adhere to constitutional requirements in dealing with foreign affairs
issues.
Dualism perceives international and national systems as separate
and distinct legal orders that operate on different levels:
Dualist doctrine points to the essential difference of international
law and municipal law, consisting primarily in the fact that the two
systems regulate different subject-matter. International law is a law
between sovereign states; municipal law applies within a state and
regulates the relations of its citizens with each other and with the
executive. 6°

its
This concept tends
61 to scrutinize international law by examining
internal validity.
Domestic courts have a significant role in international law,
which relies on domestic legal mechanisms to a great extent.62 "The
court thus employs the institutional authority conferred upon it by the
local law to give effectiveness to the prescriptions of the international
order, which lacks appropriate structures of its own for their
enforcement." 63 Differences in legal structures may certainly cause
problems, but authorities at both the international and domestic
levels are aware of the inevitable application of international legal
norms to domestic systems. The transparency of the two legal

59. See Bedjaoui, supra note 44, at 47-48 ("Reception can be viewed as a
technique whereby the rampart of state sovereignty is breached, thus enabling the
norm or the judicial decision to pass from the international legal order into the
municipal legal order.").
60. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-34 (1979).
61. See HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS 154

(1993) ("International law can be applied by municipal courts only when it has been
'transformed' or 'incorporated' into municipal law."). For discussion of the notion of
internal validity, see C.C. SCHREUER,supra note 58, at 165.
62. See MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1993) ("In
fact, most times when international legal rules are applied by judges, the setting is a
domestic, not an international, court.").
63. C.C. SCHREUER, supra note 58, at 166.
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systems should be seen as a quality that does not necessarily frustrate
the concept of dualism. Because globalization is one of the features
of modem times, the courts' response to this policy is expected. U.S.
courts acknowledge the importance of international law. 64
The present problem may be seen as focused on international
decisions, or only on the decisions of the World Court and how the
U.S. courts respond to them. Although the U.S. Constitution
provides that Congress has the power to outlaw violations of
international law, it does not contain a general provision that deals
directly with the reception of international decisions.65 In the absence
of such a provision, several possible solutions exist-to give no effect
to international decisions; to treat them as foreign judgments; or to
defer to other, more general, international law theories.
The
relationship between U.S. courts and the I.C.J. appears neither very
strong nor legally prescribed.6 Although U.S. courts have made some
observations on I.C.J. decisions, 67 any deference to the I.C.J. found in
them was more a matter of coincidence than obedience.6 U.S. judges
respected the I.C.J. decision that favored the United States in
64. See THOMAS M.

FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

109 (2d ed., 1993) ("The law of nations is as deeply rooted

in American jurisprudence as any other legal concept ....

Despite this broad

potential base on which to build, the U.S. courts have incorporated the law of nations
quite sparingly, no doubt out of concern that the judiciary might otherwise become
embroiled in foreign policy questions. Occasionally, however, the courts have
applied the law of nations to do justice, particularly where there was no
countermanding domestic black letter law.").
65. See C.C. SCHREUER, supra note 58, at 168.
66. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 58, at 344-45 ("The reception of I.C.J.
decisions by domestic courts is a relatively new question that lacks an established
analytical framework. The relationship between the I.C.J. and other courts and
tribunals has few parallels. It is unlike the interaction of courts of first instance and
appellate courts within a single legal system; relations between the supranational
court of a regional treaty system, such as the European Court of Justice, and the
domestic courts of the system's member states; or relations between courts of coequal sovereign states. In many respects, the reception of I.C.J. decisions by
domestic courts is a whole new category in itself.").
67. See id. at 353. I shall take into account the decisions that involved the United
States, since although U.S. courts have also used other I.C.J. decisions, they have
done so more to determine the substance of international legal norms than because
of an international obligation. As far as the first question is concerned, two I.C.J.
decisions are relevant: United States Diplomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24), and Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against
Nicaragua(Nicar.v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).

68. Here I use the expression of Professor Harold H. Koh. See Harold H. Koh,
The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623,

627-33 (1998).
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Diplomaticand ConsularStaff in Tehran, while the introduction of an
I.C.J. decision unfavorable to the United States in Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua was met with domestic
defenses precluding its application by the courts.69
U.S. courts have not established a formal connection that might
assure the direct implementation of those decisions through a clear
and firm obligation." In Breard,the Supreme Court was aware of the
provisional measures order's existence. Nevertheless, the Court only
mentioned it without making any legal observations regarding its
effect.7 Because the Court did not provide it with any legal effect, the
Court implicitly denied it all legal force. Breard implicitly suggested
that the rulings of the I.C.J. are not binding in the United States.'
Thus, formal arguments supporting the reception of international
decisions in U.S. courts necessarily rely on indirect solutions, namely
treaty obligations, general international law, and customary
international law.73
1.

Treaty Obligations

The court could have given effect to the I.C.J. Order in Breardby
deferring to the U.N. Charter and the I.C.J. Statute.
Both
international conventions have the same effect as treaties in U.S. law
because they were ratified by the President with the advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate, as provided for by Article II of the
Constitution. The treaty-making power is reserved to the federal
government and allocated between the Senate and the President.
Article VI of the Constitution states that "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." 75 The Supremacy Clause places treaties
69. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 58, at 359.
70. See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
935 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("For purposes of the present lawsuit, the key question is not
simply whether the United States has violated any of these three legal norms but
whether such violations can be remedied by an American court or whether they can
only be redressed on an international level.").
71. Breard, 118 S.Ct. at 1354.
72. See Postscript,31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 320,323 (1998).
73. Such an approach is similar to the way in which international law arguments

are presented in the previous chapter.
74. Executive agreements gain the protection of the Supremacy Clause as

treaties. See George Slyz, InternationalLaw in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS

75. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

77-78 (T.M. Franck & G.H. Fox eds., 1996).
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at the same level as federal laws, imposing treaty obligations on every
state regardless of its own constitution and laws.
Nevertheless, the implementation of treaties into the U.S. legal
system does not function as simply as the constitutional provision
envisages. Several doctrines and rules govern the area of treaty
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, as well as
implementation.
corresponding provisions of the I.C.J. Statute, transfer adjudicatory
authority to the U.N. and its organs, and the attribution of binding
legal force to their decisions.7 6 Seeing those conventions in this light,
this perspective opens new questions for the U.S. courts. As Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor has observed:
There are many important substantive issues to be addressed by the
courts in a judicial fashion. For instance, the vesting of certain
adjudicatory authority in international tribunals presents a very
significant constitutional question in my country. Article III of our
Constitution reserves to federal courts the power to decide cases
and controversies, and the U.S. Congress may not delegate to
another tribunal "the essential attributes of judicial power"
(Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)). Whether our Congress has done so with respect to
tribunals created by different treaties and agreements is a critical
question, but one that could only be answered in specific cases....
[W]hat effect international tribunals have on domestic courts may
inform the analysis as to whether Congress acted constitutionally in
creating the international panels and vesting them with substantive
adjudicatory authority.77
American jurisprudence has shown considerable deference to
international treaties, trying to adapt domestic considerations to the
international obligations of the United States. 78 Still, one may find
some examples to the contrary,79 whether or not this inconsistency can
76. Even some executive agreements, by which the United States acceded to the
NAFTA and WTO, are "binding under international law as treaties. They obligate
the United States to comply with the decisions of multilateral entities (footnotes
omitted)." Joel Paul, Geopolitical Constitution:Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 678-79 (1998).
77. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, INTERNATIONAL LAW
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 19 (T. M. Frank & G. H. Fox eds., 1996).
78. Three famous cases illustrate the point: The Charming Betsy 6 U.S. 64, 2 L.
Ed. 208 (1804), Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and United States v.
Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y 1988) [hereinafter

PLO].
79. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Societe Nationale Industrielle
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be seen as a dichotomy that is very often incorporated in legal
concepts. Good faith interpretation of treaties actually refers to
avoiding the frustration of a treaty in its construction and

implementation. Although treaties have the same legal force as
federal law, they are still not of the same character.' Arguably, the
Court acted in bad faith in the Breard case by not applying other
methods of treaty interpretation.8 '
As the doctrine of dualism tends to prove the internal validity of
international law, mechanisms developed for that purpose are of an
exclusively domestic character.y Can one say that the law of the land
required compliance with the order of the I.C.J.?n Is it possible to say
that Breard's execution has put the United States in violation of the
U.N. Charter and the Statute of the I.C.J.?

Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
80. "These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name
for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any
bargain with us which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long
and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may,
without doubt, amend or repeal them, and it will not be disputed that they who make
treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not
by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently that as the
consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterward be
to alter or cancel them." The Federalist No. 63 (John Jay).
81. See Jordan J. Paust, Agora: Breard, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under
the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 691, 693 (1998). According to Paust,
The per curiam opinion stated that international law requires "a clear and
express statement to the contrary" or else "procedural rules of the forum
state will govern implementation of" a treaty. This statement reflects
several misunderstandings: (1) evident confusion of conflicts principles with
international law; (2) a miserly misstatement of the law of treaties
(especially the obligation to perform in good faith and the rule that internal
law may not be invoked as justification for a failure to perform); (3)
inattention to the role of customary law as interpretive background; and (4)
inattention to the rule that treaties are to be construed liberally to protect
express and implied rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. See James A. R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law
of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,46
AM. J. CoMP. L. 421,422 (1998) ("Even though the UN Charter is the supreme law of
the land, its domestic legal status within the United States is qualified by a number of
other considerations.").
83. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Agora: Breard, Breard and the FederalPower to
Require Compliance with L C.J. Orders of ProvisionalMeasures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
683, 685 (1998) ("By hypothesis, the law of the land required compliance with the
Order and thus preempted the conflicting state order setting the execution date.").

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 23:27

a. Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
The application of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was discussed
before the U.S. courts only once, in Committee of U.S. Citizens Living
in Nicaragua v. Reagan.' The D.C. Circuit refused to give effect to
this article using domestic doctrines for treaty implementation that
barred its application in this case.'
The court gave several reasons for such a holding. The
appellants in the case, comprised of organizations and individuals
who opposed United States policy in Central America, claimed to
have suffered physical, economic and other injuries from the war in
Nicaragua. Before this case was instituted in the U.S. courts, the
I.C.J. had entered the judgment in the lawsuit instituted by Nicaragua
against the United States that held that America's support of military
actions by the so-called Contras against the government of Nicaragua
violated both customary international law and a treaty between the
United States and Nicaragua. The I.C.J. concluded that the United
States "is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all
such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal
obligations.""'
The U.S. court stated that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was not
enforceable in U.S. courts as a treaty provision because this Article
was not self-executing and it was preempted by subsequent
Congressional action. The court tied its holding to the particular
circumstances of the case:
Congress has not clearly repudiated the requirement in Article 94
that every nation comply with an ICJ decision "in any case to which
it is a party." U.N. Charter, art. 94. Rather, our government
asserts that it never consented to ICJ jurisdiction in cases like the
84. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
85. It is useful to note one theoretical approach to this type of problem in
domestic legal systems:
Not surprisingly, the question of a possible collision between international
obligations and precedents of the local courts has attracted attention
primarily with respect to common law countries. Scholarly opinion is
practically unanimous in the rejection of the principle of stare decisis for
decision of domestic courts dealing with questions of international law.
Jenks has suggested to solve this problem for English law by treating
domestic decision on international law like judgments on a point of foreign
law which are not subject to the doctrine of precedent.
SCHREUER, supra note 58, at 249.
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 149 (June
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Nicaragua dispute. Thus, Congress may well believe that its
support for the Contras, while contravening the ICJ judgment, does
not violate its treaty obligation under Article 94Y
The court therefore viewed Article 94 in relation to the
particular act of Congress that regulated the financing of the Contras.
The court interpreted Article 94 through the circumstances and
substance of the I.C.J. judgment in this particular case, relying on the
United States' acceptance of the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction for this special
case. The interpretation of Article 94 came hand-in-hand with the
interpretation of the particular judgment, which might mean that the
applicability of this article depends on the substance of I.C.J.
decisions and that Article 94 cannot be construed alone. The rule of
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaraguais that the Article 94

has to be interpreted together with the particular judgment and that it
should not be taken as standing alone.
This was not the only ground for not accepting the legal effect of
Article 94. The court also found that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
simply did not confer rights on private individuals.Y In this analysis
the court mainly relied on Article 94 as such, with less reference to
the particular case, comparing this case with the previous grounds for
the rejection of Article 94 as applicable in the U.S. courts. Still, some
reference was made:
Because only nations can be parties before the ICJ, appellants are
not "parties" within the meaning of [Article 94, paragraph 2].
Clearly, this clause does not contemplate that individuals having no
relationship to the ICJ case should enjoy a private right to enforce

the ICJ's decision."
The court's reading of international and U.S. law in reaching this
holding thwarted individual attempts to have this judgment enforced,
and the door stayed almost completely closed for future individual
invocation of I.C.J. judgments in U.S. courts. 9° However, the court
87. See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 936.
88. One previous decision imposed a more general prohibition in this respect,
comparing it to the Nicaragua case. See Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.
1984) (individual plaintiffs did not have standing to raise claims under the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
89. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 936 (emphasis
added).
90. It is interesting to note that in Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
"the court was invited to hold that mandatory sanctions applied by the UN Security
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did not dispute the possibility of a situation where a state that is a
party in a proceeding before the I.C.J. tries to use the I.C.J. decision
as an argument before the U.S. courts. Also, the court stated that the
I.C.J. was not intended to "vest citizens who reside in a U.N. member
nation with authority to enforce an ICJ decision against their own
government."'" Angel Breard was a Paraguayan citizen and sued the

United States.
It seems that several elements of this case might be applied to
Breard. The way that the court read Article 94 implies than not all
future decisions of the I.C.J. will be without legal effect. 2 If the
consent to I.C.J. jurisdiction is not disputed in a particular case, and if
there is no subsequent act of Congress repudiating the specific
prescription of the court's decision, then the I.C.J. decision might be
viewed as binding under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, subject to a
valid connection between the particular I.C.J. case and an individual
who is trying to invoke it.
In the Breard case, the U.S. Supreme Court did not discuss the
I.C.J. order in this manner. Although the decision of the I.C.J. came
into play, the Court did not even mention Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter. It is useful to find parallels between Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaraguaand Breard.
If one puts Article 94 of the U.N. Charter in conjunction with the
circumstances of Breard, as the U.S. court did in Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua,one may find that this rule would have
had different consequences. The jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was not
disputed by the U.S. government,93 nor had Congress acted in a way
that might have prevented U.S. courts from taking into account the
substance of the I.C.J. ruling. Congress stayed silent with respect to
the execution of Breard. Furthermore, there is an act of Congress
Council under the UN Charter are self-executing treaty obligations which can be
brandished by a US litigant. The court, in this instance, did not specifically deny this."
FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 64, at 362.
91. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 938 (emphasis
added).
92. The court did not interpret Article 94 of the U.N. Charter as standing alone,
but in connection with the I.C.J. decision, thus indirectly showing that Article 94
cannot be judged before the courts alone and that the decisions must be taken into
account as well.
93. Prima facie jurisdiction was found in Article 41 of the I.C.J. Statute.
Jurisdiction for the merits was prescribed by the Optional Protocol appended to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and both the United States and Paraguay
consented to this international agreement.
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that might be said to support respect for U.S. obligations arising
under the U.N. Charter-the United Nations Participation Act,94
which "prescribes the domestic internal arrangements within our
Government for giving effect to our participation in [the U.N.] and
sets up machinery for complying with certain of the major
international commitments which the United States assumed upon
ratification of the Charter." 95

As far as other conditions are concerned, it seems that the
situation in Breard, compared to that in Committee of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua,is different, although the rule of the latter can be
applied so as to give effect to the I.C.J. decision in Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, (Para.v. U.S.). Unlike in the I.C.J. decision
regarding Nicaragua (which itself did not make any reference to any
individual), the I.C.J. order in Breardwas very precise and referred to
Angel Francisco Breard.96 The reference to a specific individual
established a relevant connection between the I.C.J. case and the
Breard case before the U.S. court.97 Moreover, there was another
actor seeking relief in the U.S. courts: Paraguay. Paraguay was a
party before the World Court and the United States did not dispute
the jurisdiction in that case. 98 Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua was connected to the I.C.J.'s decision in Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.).' The United
States contested jurisdiction in the preliminary phase of the I.C.J. by
objections. After the I.C.J. confirmed its jurisdiction, the United
States decided not to appear at the merits stage. The U.S. court
found this contest of jurisdiction in the particular case relevant."°
94. 22 U.S.C. §§ 287(a)-(e) (1994).
95. 91 Cong. Rec. 12, 267 (1945) (statement of Sen. Bloom). See also Nafziger &
Wise, supra note 82, at 425.
96. In Breard, the I.C.J. indicated "the following provisional measures: The
United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should
inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this
Order." 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9).
97. Cf Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 936.
98. Article I of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, is the means by which the United States submitted to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J.
99. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
100. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 932 ("Prior to the
I.C.J.'s decision, the United States withdrew from the merits phase of the court's
proceedings, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over Nicaragua's
application."). See also id. at 936, 940 ("[O]ur government asserts that it never
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However, the United States never disputed the jurisdiction of the

I.C.J. in Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations (Para.v. U.S.).
It seems that one of the options in this case was to receive the
I.C.J.'s ruling in accordance with the leading U.S. decision regarding
the application of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.' Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua'°' left open space that might have been
construed so as to let the I.C.J. ruling come into play. The binding
character of the order, as a matter of treaty law, might have found its
way through the application of Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also emphasized
that "the United States has a vital national interest in complying with
international law."'" Putting all these elements together, one may
cite the opinion of Professor Henkin as a conclusion:
My view that the Order was legally binding compels me to the
conclusion that the United States was required, as a matter of
international law, to take the provisional measures indicated by the
Court. That international legal obligation derives from Article
41(1) of the Statute of the International Court, a treaty of the
United States made by the President with the advice and consent of
the U.S. Senate. Under international law, and under the U.S.
Constitution, the Court's Order had the same character and status
as a U.S. treaty obligation as does the Statute of the Court
underlying the Order.

consented to I.C.J. jurisdiction in cases like the Nicaragua dispute.").
101. There are some opinions to the contrary:
Petitioners have relied on the United Nations Charter to argue that
provisional measures are binding, but the language of the Charter does not
support that conclusion. Article 94 (1) provides that "each member * * *
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [I.C.J.] in any case to which it
is a party." (emphasis added). "The decision," in the context of Article
94(1) of the Charter, evidently refers to the final decision of the
International Court. Article 94(2) of the Charter elaborates that "if any
party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it by a
judgment rendered by the [I.C.J.], the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council." (emphasis added). Significantly, the Security Council has

never acted to enforce provisional measures indicated by the I.C.J....
Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, The Facts, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 666, 672 (1998).

The non-exhaustion of procedural means before the Security Council does not
mean that the international legal norm had not been activated before the procedural
part. Article 94 does not influence its substantive character.
102. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan.
103. Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988).
104. Louis Henkin, Agora: Breard, ProvisionalMeasures, U.S. Treaty Obligations,
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However, it is difficult to shift from a horizontal to a vertical
analysis and vice versa. 5 The majority opinion supports the non-selfexecuting character of the U.N. Charter as a whole, which would bar
any separate examination of Article 94 and would prevent private
parties from using I.C.J. decisions in U.S. courts.1" I find this a priori
approach to be mechanical, as I have tried finding a way for a more
precise interpretation of the holding in Committee of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua. The implementation and enforcement of
international treaties can be considered as a province of the federal
government and as a federal interest. Indeed, "the Supreme Court
should have entered a stay to preserve the important federal interest
in ensuring compliance with the measures." 1 7 The introduction of the
I.C.J. decision through the I.C.J. Statute and Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter appears to be complex. Since both of these documents are
treaties, I shall try to address each obstacle that prevents
implementation of the World Court's decision in the U.S. courts.
b.

The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties

One of the hurdles to determining whether a treaty obligation is
binding is the doctrine of self-executing treaties." This doctrine
presupposes a certain legal character of a treaty in order to have it
applied in the courts. A treaty is self-executing if no additional
legislative action is required for its application in the courts." There
is a distinction among treaties regarding the branch of the federal
government that is addressed by them. If a treaty addresses a
political branch, the treaty lacks a self-executing character. ° The
next question is whether a treaty that addresses the judicial branch
and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679, 680 (1998).
105. See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A
Modest Proposal,100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991).
106. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 58, at 356.
107. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Agora: Breard, The Justiciabilityof Paraguay'sClaim
of Treaty Violation, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697,702 (1998).
108. "Despite good arguments in favor of a presumption that treaties generally
should be regarded as self-executing, recent practice may run in the opposite
direction by presuming that international agreements are not self-executing."
Nafziger & Wise, supra note 82, at 424 (1998).
109. See generally Slyz, supra note 74 ("The centrality of the idea of 'self-executing
treaties' to American foreign relations law is remarkable, given that Article VI of the
Constitution does not distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties.").
110. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L. L 695, 695-96 (1995) (citing authorities).
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confers any private rights upon individuals.
It seems difficult to give precise predictions about the character
of a treaty at the moment of its ratification; the solution of this
problem seems to be reserved for the implementation procedure,".
and the courts are the ones to make the appropriate qualifications."'
The Ninth Circuit has described this process as follows:
The extent to which an international agreement establishes
affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without
implementing legislation must be determined in each case by
reference to many contextual factors: the purposes of the treaty and
the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures
and institutions
appropriate for direct implementation, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and
the immediate and
long-range social consequences of self- or non3

self-execution.1

However, it seems that the courts rely upon the intent expressed in a

treaty to a great extent."4 The consequence of a "negative diagnosis"
is the non-enforcement of the treaty in the U.S. courts; in other
words, remedies for a treaty violation cannot be found in the province
of the courts of the United States.

One of the problems is how to analyze the treaty-as a whole or
as a group of provisions where each provision can be treated as
having independent legal status. Is it possible to disjoin a treaty into
self-executing and non-self-executing provisions? The answer is
affirmative."5 "It is well accepted that some provisions of a treaty
may be self-executing while others are not."".6 It has been pointed out
several times that the U.N. Charter has a non-self-executing

111. "But when express or implied congressional powers are not so clear, the line
between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-executing' treaties is controversial." Nafziger
& Wise, supra note 82.

112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
§ 154 (1965) ("Whether an international agreement of the United States is

STATES

self-executing is a matter of interpretation to be determined by the courts.").
113. People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th

Cir. 1974).
114. See Franck & Glennon, supra note 64, at 342,348.
115. See id. at 342 ("It should be noted, however, that even in the U.S., treaties do
not automatically become the equivalent of statutory law in the sense of being
enforceable in courts by the 'beneficiaries' of its provisions. Some do, or some parts
may .... ") (emphasis added).

116. Vazquez, supra note 110, at 709 (footnote omitted).
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character. 1 7 However, it is possible to extract certain provision of the
Charter and analyze them differently."'
The issue of the effects of international decisions, examined in
light
of this doctrine, focuses the Breard case on two important
the
issues: the question of the intended addressee of the I.C.J. order, and
the interpretation of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. If the order is
seen as directed to the political branches of the United States, as I
think that it was in this case, the U.S. courts may treat it as binding,
regardless of whether a treaty confers private rights upon individuals,
which remains an open question. It is interesting to point out that the
application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
was the cause of the proceeding before the World Court, was not
barred by its non-self-executing character in any respect; the last-intime doctrine actually deprived Breard of the ability to raise this
question in federal courts. It seems that the Vienna Convention has a
self-executing character with respect to recognized private rights, and
the Fourth Circuit recognized that it provided individual rights to
Breard. 19' Moreover, the U.S. government acknowledged that the
Vienna Convention was self-executing."u However, the Supreme
Court noted that the Vienna Convention does not confer upon a
petitioner a private right of action to set aside a criminal conviction
and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions because
neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention expressly
provide such a private right of action2' I find this interpretation

117. See, e.g., Nafziger & Wise, supra note 82, at 424 ("Courts in the United States
have generally held that the United Nations Charter is not self-executing. The
question has come up most notably in efforts to invoke the human rights clauses of
the Charter in domestic litigation.").
118. This was done in the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua with
respect to Article 94, and in People of Saipan regarding Article 79 when the article
was not proclaimed as non-self-executing.
119. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998). Also, in Faulder v.
Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), the court held that an arrestee's rights under the
Vienna Convention were violated when Texas officials failed to inform the arrestee
of his right to contact the Canadian Consulate. Similarly, in United States v.
Lombera, 170 F.3d at 1243, the court stated, "Because Article 36(1)(b) [of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations] establishes individual rights, these rights must be
enforced by our courts."
120. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, supra note 107, at 698.
121. Breard was invoked in a similar proceeding that happened only a month
afterwards when a district court found that the Bilateral Convention between Mexico
and the United Stated provides such a private right of action. Consulate General of
Mex. v. Phillips, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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misplaced, as this is not the only focus of the remedying aspect of the
Vienna Convention, nor is it something to which the I.C.J. order
referred. Here one can see how two procedures directed to the same
issue collided again: treaty implementation procedures and the
acceptance of an international decision were barred by the same
domestic arguments. Although I do not want to discuss fully the
implementation of the Vienna Convention in this case, it can be
indicated that even if those procedures were seen as acting in concert,
the doctrine of self-executing treaties prevented them, in one way or
another, from giving effect to the international legal norm. In Breard,
purely domestic arguments of a procedural character were given full
effect, whereas some domestic arguments of an international
character, such as the CharmingBetsy rule,m were ignored."z
One may go back to the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
Nicaragua and its interpretation of Article 94. The court in that case
did not discuss the question of the addressee, since it was more
concerned about the private rights of individuals under both an
international treaty and the particular judgment in question. As has
been noted, the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua test
might have been applied to Breard successfully with respect to the
question of the private rights of individuals as connected with a
particular judgment. But even if the U.S. Supreme Court had
reached this conclusion, it would not have necessarily meant that the
self-executing dilemma was completely solved, due to the problem
raised by the question respecting the addressee of the I.C.J. order.' 24
The U.S. Supreme Court might have found it to be one addressed to
the political branches of the government and, thus, leave the I.C.J.
order without legal effect." The order would certainly have been
122. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117 (1804) ("It has also

been observed that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations, if any other possible construction remains. . . . These principles are
believed to be correct, and they ought to be kept in view in construing the act now
under consideration.").
123. See Paust, supra note 81 at 692.

124. See Vazquez, supra note 110, at 722-23 ("[A] treaty might be judicially
unenforceable because the obligation it imposes is of a type that, under our system of
separated powers, cannot be enforced directly by the courts. This branch of the
doctrine calls for a judgment concerning the allocation of treaty-enforcement power
as between the courts and the legislature.").
125. It is worth noting here the existence of the U.N. Participation Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 287 (1994), which "prescribes the domestic internal arrangements within our
Government for giving effect to our participation in the United Nations and sets up
machinery for complying with certain of the major international commitments which

The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions

1999]

judicially unenforceable for reasons other than the question of private
rights of action, due to the separation of powers doctrine and the fact
that it was addressed to the political branches. The questions relating
to the implementing legislation, addressees, and the existence of
private rights are part of the concept of self-executing treaties. 26 This
is especially pertinent because of the character of the I.C.J.'s orders as
opposed to its judgments.
This complex and profound doctrine puts forward arguments
that raised insurmountable obstacles to this order's acceptance on a
treaty-based ground. On the other hand, the U.S. courts declared
that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention confers private rights upon
individuals and therefore is a self-executing provision. If the order
itself was not a sufficient reason to comply with the international
obligations, there was still the Vienna Convention as a device to
justify compliance.
The Last-in-Time Rule and the Positionsof Congress and
the Executive
As mentioned above, the self-executing doctrine did not prevent
the U.S. court from complying with international obligations. The
biggest hurdle was the last-in-time rule, which outweighed the
benefits and advantages of both the self-executing doctrine and the
Vienna Convention. The last-in-time doctrine applies in cases when
treaties and federal statutes conflict. The U.S. courts first seek to
reconcile their conflicting provisions. "If no such reconciliation is
possible, then the rule is that the treaty or federal statutory law later
in time controls."'27
Under the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing,
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no
superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe
them so as to give effect to both if that can be done without violating
c.

the United States assumed upon ratification of the Charter." 91 Cong. Rec. 12, 267

(1945) (statement of Sen. Bloom).
126. See Stefan Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v.

Posta. Win at Any Pricel 74 AM. I. INT'L. L. 892, 896-97 (1980). The question
whether private individual rights fall under the self-executing doctrine is unclear. At

any rate, the final consequence is treaty uninvocability. See generally Vazquez, supra
note 110.
127. MARK W. JAN1S, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (1993).
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the language of either. But if the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other, provided that the treaty on the subject is
self-executing."
The last-in-time rule is also a product exclusively of American
jurisprudence and its interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. This
doctrine was established by Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616
(1870), and Head Moneys Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).29 The treaties
and federal law are placed on the same footing, and both legal
sources are construed by the Supreme Court as equal expressions of
congressional will. Therefore, if two legislatures' wordings conflict,
that later in time prevails-lex posterior derogat legi priori. This rule
should be interpreted through the jurisprudence.
One finds
Charming Betsy, PLO and other cases as leading examples of the
deference to the international legal order when this rule is applied.
Charming Betsy ruled that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."13 In PLO, the Court held that the
Headquarters Agreement was a valid treaty and not superseded by
the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) because the ATA did not require
closure of the PLO Permanent Observer Mission:
The Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations is nowhere
mentioned in haec verba in this act, as we have already observed.
It is nevertheless contended by the United States that the foregoing
provision requires the closing of the Mission, and this in spite of
possibly inconsistent international obligations. According to the
government, the act is so clear that this possibility is nonexistent.131
In the Breard, the courts found that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
(effective April 24, 1996), derogated the enforcement of Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention in federal courts. On the other side, the lastin-time doctrine was not an impediment for the I.C.J. order as related
to Article 94 of the Charter and the I.C.J. Statute.
128. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,194 (1888).
129. According to Head Moneys Cases, "A treaty.., is a law of the land as an act
of congress is .... But even in this aspect of the case there is nothing in this law
which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The constitution gives it no superiority
over an act of congress in this respect, which may be repealed or modified by an act
of a later date." Id. at 599. Other relevant cases include Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888), and Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

130. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
131. 695 F. Supp. at 1469.
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The I.C.J. order as a treaty obligation did not have obstacles in
the last-in-time doctrine, taking into account the Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua. This approach relies upon the starting
premise that the I.C.J. order is a treaty obligation. In Committee of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua,the court found the act of Congress
for financing the Contras to have repudiated the substance of the
I.C.J. judgment. In Breard,Congress stayed silent with respect to the
I.C.J.'s ruling and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The U.S. federal courts held in this case that a claim based on the
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations cannot be
raised in federal court if the party has failed to raise such a claim in
state court.
The party has procedurally defaulted under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Before this act came
into force on April 24, 1996, this procedural requirement did not
exist. The courts found that AEDPA superseded Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention. The supporting argument was that the rules of
the forum state govern the procedure of treaty application in
domestic courts. This rule exists in international law, but subject to
certain restrictions.
As mentioned above, Charming Betsy and PLO are strong
international law arguments of domestic origin regarding the last-intime rule. While the CharmingBetsy rule refers to the interpretation
of international law in all respects, PLO is principally focused on this
doctrine, limiting its scope to the condition of the explicit intent
expressed in the statute tending to supersede the treaty. 3' The
holding of PLO states that not every act can supersede a treaty, but
only those that are clear about the derogation of a specific treaty.
The last-in-time rule itself shows provincialism, while the courts'
willingness to construe domestic law consistent with international law
demonstrates internationalism.
The holding of PLO is applicable to Breard regarding the way
the court interpreted an act that tends to supersede a treaty. As the
Breard court found, the rules of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 had overruled Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. However, there was no attempt
at reconciling those two rules." Breard was not involved in terrorist

132. See id.
133. See Detev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458,459
(1998); see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641
(1933) (stating that the Court would apply this rule only where Congress was clear in
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activities, so the application of the act with respect to its superseding
the Vienna Convention is questionable,"M especially taking into
account the PLO decision where an even more applicable statute did
not trump the treaty due to the lack of explicit will in that respect.
Comparing Breard and PLO, it seems that an interpretation in good
faith of the domestic legal rules was deficient. The PLO court was
looking at the history of the Anti-Terrorism Act and analyzed its
language trying to establish the clear intent of the legislature to
revoke a specific obligation.
If the complete analogy were applied
to Breard, it would mean that the court should reconcile the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act with the Vienna
Convention.
Moreover, the proceeding before the state courts started in 1992,
when the violation actually happened and while the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act had not yet been enacted. The
problem of ex post facto laws may be the impediment in this case so
as to prevent a person from having the appropriate remedy for a
violation.
The last-in-time rule as such and as applied in this case shows not
only that the procedural rules of the forum state apply in dealing with
international prescriptions, but also that the non-implementation of
this international decision lies solely on procedural grounds. This
aspect shows deeper roots of the doctrine as well as its policy reasons:
An examination of these forms of international review is
handicapped by the fact that the grounds given by a court for the
non-application of an international decision need not represent its
true motives. Thus, a refusal to implement an international
decision based on procedural grounds can have its true reasons in
the disapproval of its material contents. The withdrawal into
procedural niceties is often the only possibility to resist a
disagreeable decision and to avoid its consequences. On the other
hand, the endeavor to eliminate the international decision as
quickly as possible from the proceedings can also result from an
expressing its will for the abrogation of a treaty and that the Court will not infer this
easily but will tend to reconcile the conflicting enactments).
134. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of
Federalismto U.S. Foreign Relations,92 Am. J. Int'l. L. 675, 678 (1998).
135. 695 F. Supp. at 1468 ("First, neither the Mission nor the Headquarters
Agreement is mentioned in the ATA itself. Such an inclusion would have left no

doubt as to Congress' intent on a matter which had been raised repeatedly with
respect to this act, and its absence here reflects equivocation and avoidance, leaving
the court without clear interpretative guidance in the language of the act.").
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insecurity and aversion on the part of the judge due to the
international character of the decision involved.136

d. Justiciability
Another possible approach to this case is through the doctrine of
political questions. As politics, or more precisely foreign affairs, "are
' 137
different from all other matters of state in some crucial fashion, ,
they deserve other treatment, and the "conduct of foreign affairs by
' The
the political agencies should be immune to judicial scrutiny."138
respect of the courts of the United States for the separation of powers
and the need to keep balance among all branches of the federal
government are accommodated through this doctrine. "Indeed, to
say that a law raises political questions is to say that its enforcement
has been allocated to a branch other than the judiciary,
and in this
1 39
case that branch would clearly be the Executive.
International law and international relations are closely
connected and intertwined. The rise of every international norm is
caused and accomplished by political efforts in the international
arena. The problem arises when exclusively interstate relations try to
penetrate into domestic legal systems due to the object of their
regulation. This aspect emerges every time an individual is protected
by or given some right under an international instrument. The
instrument represents the consent of two governments. Treaties are
necessarily political, but the legal character of the instruments in
question still can be preserved.
U.S. courts have refused to deal with the questions of
"recognition, territorial sovereignty, and international legality of
hostilities. Such 'nonjusticiable' disputes involve relations between
states."' The problem lies in the judicial qualification of political
questions, which largely depends on the circumstances of a particular
case and the estimation by the court as to how far the discretionary
power of the executive is endangered. 4 ' The consequence of the
136. See Schreuer, supra note 58, at 29.
137. T. M. FRANCK, POLrTCAL QUESTIONS/JUDIcIAL ANSWERS 3 (1992).
138. Id.
139. Vazquez, supra note 83, at 685-86.
140. Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2300.
141. See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 932 ("The
district court dismissed appellants' entire complaint on the ground that it involved
nonjusticiable political questions. We believe the trial court's reliance on the political
question doctrine was misplaced, particularly to the extent that appellants seek to
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nonjusticiability determination is a refusal by the court to give a legal
remedy for the alleged violation. It seems that courts deem
international decisions as nonjusticiable quite often. 42'
In Breard, both writs of certiorari were denied, which may
indicate the reluctance of the judiciary to deal with the matter as a
political question. U.S. arguments before the courts, as well as the
manner in which the Supreme Court dealt with this matter, amounted
to the effect of a nonjusticiability determination.'43
Even some arguments of the U.S. Government and some
examples from previous judicial practice seem to undercut the U.S.
position. "[T]he U.S. government [has] noted the availability of
adjudication on the international plane, under the Vienna
Convention's Optional Protocol to which both the United States and
Paraguay are parties."'' 4 This approach may persuade the courts to
not give a remedy to Paraguay for a treaty violation. On the other
hand, this can provide the courts with one more reason to give effect
to the I.C.J. order, since this statement reflects U.S. foreign policy
goals. Not giving effect to the order would amount to unreasonable
interference with U.S. foreign policy. One of the reasons why the
I.C.J. order came into play in the first place was the judgment of the
I.C.J. that the justiciability question was not resolved properly before
domestic courts. If the violation of the treaty had been remedied in
vindicate personal rights rather than to conform America's foreign policy to
international legal norms.").
142. See SCHREUER, supra note 58, at 31.
143. According to Lori Fisler Damrosch,
At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed
a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial
consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme
Court denied a stay in Breard's case foreclosed adequate consideration of
the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred
Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane....
Against adjudication in federal courts, the U.S. Government argued
expansively that "treaty disputes between governments are not justiciable in
domestic courts." This general heading subsumed several different points,
including that a foreign state could not bring suit in U.S. courts on any treaty
claim, that a consular officer is not a "person" for purposes of suing to
enforce treaty rights under federal law, that the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations itself contemplates no judicial remedies of the sort
demanded, and that the case presented a "political question" that could be
addressed only through diplomatic channels rather than the courts.
Damrosch, supra note 107, at 697-98 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 698 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 11-27,
Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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the U.S. courts, Paraguay would not have had a cause of action before
the I.C.J., nor the prima facie case necessary for a provisional
measures procedure.
As only one previous example shows, the court's willingness to
solve the case substantively may outweigh the procedure before the
World Court.
After Societe International pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) was
instituted, Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.)'45 before the I.C.J. was
terminated.
Breard certainly has both horizontal and vertical aspects.46 It
involved another state, an international treaty, an international court
decision, and a pending proceeding before the World Court. On the
other hand, there was an individual claiming private rights under the
international convention, trying to connect himself with the
international decision.'
Balancing between these two aspects, the
court chose to protect the state interest, as it was indirectly implicated
by the behavior of the executive in this case." But was this the right
way to pursue this goal? If the court wanted to shift the issue to the
executive, as it apparently did, non-recognition of the I.C.J. order,
making a justiciable issue non-justiciable, was not the best way to do
it. 4' The U.S. government could have helped the courts to deal with
the case in a more legal manner, as there was the possibility to
145. 1957 I.C.J. 105 (Oct. 24); 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Preliminary Objections).
146. See Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2300.
147. So called mixed cases are not rare before the International Court of Justice.
They appear in international law as connected with diplomatic protection when it is
undertaken due to the violation of an international treaty that protects individuals.
There are two possible violations (and causes of action): those with respect to an
individual and those with respect to a state party. These two causes are often
blurred, especially when dealing with the exhaustion of local remedies (states parties
are not bound by this condition). A good example is the ELSI case, where the U.S.
claimed a violation of the Treaty on Friendship, Navigation and Commerce with
respect to both the U.S. as a state and two American firms which it took into
diplomatic protection before the I.C.J. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A.
(ELSI), (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15.
148. This issue is analyzed infra Part II.
149. See Damrosch, supra note 107, at 704. According to Damrosch,
When Paraguay's efforts to obtain relief from the U.S. judiciary encountered
opposition from the executive branch on the ground (inter alia) that the
proper avenues for relief were diplomatic channels or international
litigation, Paraguay's initiation of the I.C.J. proceeding on the eve of
Breard's execution deserved a response from the United States that would
have enabled these serious issues to receive a full airing (where the U.S.
position might well have ultimately prevailed).
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separate things and still leave some space for the State Department to
entertain the political aspects of the case through diplomatic
negotiations. "If the U.S. Government had suggested this approach,
the dual litigation might have proceeded toward a resolution that
would have left both sides, and both courts-as well as the world
community-satisfied that the rule of law had been honored."" ° The
case does not necessarily have to be non-justiciable just because both
the state interest and private rights under international treaty are at
stake. " ' This amounts to a balancing test between these aspects and
makes the choice more difficult, influenced by a presupposition "that
international relations are properly handled by the Executive and
Legislative branches of government."'5 The courts, however, may
perceive the position of the United States on the international plane
and still preserve the justiciability of the issue; indeed, "where there is
no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations."'53 Here, the court viewed the United States as a civilized
nation with all the consequences attributed to that fact by
international law. Nevertheless, the application of international law
in U.S. courts is close to the justiciability question. The proceeding
before the World Court, if the case had not been discontinued, would
have certainly led to the combined questions of direct and indirect
state responsibility as connected with the horizontal and vertical
aspects of the case.
As noted, international decisions tend to be treated as a nonjusticiable matter for U.S. courts. Although an exception regarding
international arbitral tribunals has been created, all other decisions
are very often classified as a matter of foreign affairs."' This tendency
may be changed if more legal elements enter the international law
environment in the U.S. courts that would encourage them to refer to
noncommercial decisions as justiciable issues."' As the Supreme
150. Id.
151. See Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2300.
152. Slyz, supra note 74, at 103-04.

153. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1903).
154. See Franck & Fox, TransnationalJudicial Synergy, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW

DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 10-11.

155. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 58, at 356. According to Ordonez and
Reilly,
It is encouraging that the court rejected a blanket invocation of the doctrine
in this case, since actions involving international law are often dismissed for
this reason in U.S. courts. Instead the court found that application of the
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Court noted in Baker v. Carr, "it is error to suppose that every case or

controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.' 5 6 If domestic courts are seen as "agents of a developing
international legal order, as well as servants of various national
interests,"'57 helping to transcend the shortcomings of international
institutions, then they should act not to enlarge obstacles and hurdles,
but to fight against them vigorously. This did not happen here.
2.

GeneralInternationalLaw Obligations and Customary
InternationalLaw Arguments

Beyond those grounds discussed above, there are other grounds
in international law that could be invoked for giving effect to the
I.C.J. order in Breard. Apart from treaty obligations, general
international law offers two other grounds: customary international
law and jus cogens. Unlike customary international law, which has
been recognized as an independent ground in both U.S. law and
international law, jus cogens still has not been developed fully, mostly

due to the lack of effective and appropriate procedures on the
international plane. The concept of jus cogens exists, however, more
as a substantive argument and does not have well-established roots in
American jurisprudence. Therefore, it is more accurate and effective
to analyze this basis in connection with some other issues connected
to it, such as the protection of human rights.'
Customary international law arguments include formal elements
which elucidate rather than solve the problem.
Customary
international law does not possess the same strength and position as
treaties.
One famous case in this respect is The Paquete
Habana,whichestablished the rule:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction....
doctrine should not be contingent on the nature of the party raising the issue
or its interests, but rather on whether the claim is genuinely inappropriate
for judicial review because it raises policy questions clearly within the
authority of a political branch of the government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
156. 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962).
157. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 65 (1964).

158. The jus cogens concept, including its procedural and substantive aspects in
international and U.S. law, transparency in the international legal order with respect
to jus cogens arguments, an analysis of the vertical and horizontal structure of the
international plane, and the application of this concept, are discussed in Part III infra.
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For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations.'59
Before international custom can be applied, there are certain other
sources of law that come first-the Constitution, federal statutes, and
treaties, which are a sort of higher law placed on a higher footing:
Whatever force appellant's argument might have in a situation
where there is no applicable treaty, statute, or constitutional
provision, it has long been settled in the United States that the
federal courts are bound to recognize any one of these three
sources of law as superior to canons of international law.'O

Customary international law cannot trump any of these sources. It is
viewed, rather, as a part of federal common law. 6' In light of
Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 62 it seems that the President has the
authority to ignore customary international obligations since he
"need do no more than take official action through his subordinates
to negate the domestic effect of otherwise applicable customary
norms."'63 These aspects demonstrate the weakness of a customary
international legal argument in general, especially in this case. It may
come into play if there is a gap in U.S. law that international custom
could fill. The legal problems in this case arose, however, from the
conflicting interpretations, not from the lack of instruments governing
this area. There was no place for customary international law, and
even if there was, the rationale of Committee of U.S. Citizens Living
in Nicaragua would easily outweigh the possibility of giving effect to
an international decision on the basis of customary international
law.'6

159. 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
160. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
161. FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 64, at 109 ("The courts' tendency to speak
of international customary law as implicitly incorporated into common law can be
traced back to pre-revolutionary English and to eighteenth century American
cases.").
162. 622 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ga. 1985).
163. Slyz, supra note 74, at 96.
164. Customary international law still has some connections with international
decisions, but only indirectly. It seems that U.N. resolutions and decisions are used
as authoritative sources of customary international law. See Gregory J. Kerwin,
Note, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining
Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DuKE L.J. 876, 886
(1983).
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H. Constitutional Arguments: Foreign Affairs Matters and
Structural Limitations
The previous part of this article tried to explain how the I.C.J.
and U.S. courts interpret the legality of international decisions and
the validity of provisional measures orders. The U.S. courts'
approach to this problem is very important, as they are in a position
to give effect to international norms. The previous part demonstrated
how the U.S. courts could have used different doctrines on the
implementation of international law into the domestic legal system in
order to give effect to the I.C.J.'s request and postpone the execution
of Angel Breard. While the preceding part focuses on the position
and actions of the U.S. courts only, this part will try to elucidate the
position of another branch of the federal government-the executive.
The reason for this approach is that the U.S. legal and political system
favors the executive branch in the realm of foreign affairs, where the
President has powers to the exclusion of the two other branches of
the federal government. The executive could have used certain
constitutional arguments in order to ensure compliance with the
I.C.J.'s order. Another issue concerning the U.S. domestic legal
system is the supremacy of the federal government over states in the
domain of foreign affairs.
The legal issues in Breard activated constitutional arguments and
mechanisms. These issues involved the U.S. and Paraguay, the I.C.J.
and its mechanisms, diplomatic and consular relations and
instruments, the position of aliens and the matter of consular
protection, pending proceedings before two courts, and the possible
indirect involvement of other state members of the U.N. and the
Vienna Convention. The problem became complex and urgent and
culminated in the I.C.J. order, demanding a quick, yet legally viable
solution. Furthermore, the reputation and possible embarrassment of
the U.S., potential detrimental effects on other consular relations, and
implications for the protection of U.S. citizens abroad, were at stake.
However, the order itself urged the U.S. to take all necessary
measures to stay the execution. This question involved foreign affairs
demanding immediate action for solving complex international
relations issues. When international issues reach the state,61the organs
in charge of foreign affairs are expected to deal with them.'
165. This presumption is followed in the U.N. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, July 1969, art. 7, 81.L.M. 679: "In virtue of their functions and without

having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their
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The order was actually addressed to the U.S. government."l
What could the executive branch have done in this case in light of the
foreign affairs implications? The U.S. defense amounted to an
6 offering an
inability to act due to domestic constitutional restraints,1'
apology as a remedy, as well as a pledge to ensure future compliance
with the Vienna Convention.' 6' The U.S. was restrained by federal
constitutional impediments from complying with international legal
prescriptions.
Separation of powers and federalism were
constitutional restraints that arguably prevented the executive branch
from taking action. Seemingly, some of those restraints could have
been avoided, and U.S. domestic law could have given way to
international law.
A. The Executive and Judicial Branches: Separation of Powers
Before the I.C.J., the United States invoked the separation of
powers as an impediment to act in accordance with the order. The
U.S. argued that the solution of the whole matter depended solely on
the judiciary and that any interference was not permitted. The
validity of such an argument before the I.C.J. is a separate issue.
Here, I intend to dispute this argument, as there are several examples
proving the ability and legality of the executive to step in when
foreign issues are at stake.
If a matter of foreign affairs appears before the U.S. courts, they
are very likely to defer to the executive branch, leaving nonjusticiable questions to the autonomy of political branches. Such
deference is more readily granted if the political branches themselves
seek this kind of assistance.169
State: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs,
for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty .... "
166. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
("[T]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.").
167. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), para. 19 ("[The] Government of the United States had emphasized inter alia
that a stay of execution depended exclusively on the United States Supreme Court
and the Governor of Virginia."); see also Louis Henkin, Agora: Breard, Provisional
Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations,and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 679, 680 (1998)
("The Court's Order is addressed to the 'United States."').
168. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Para. v.
U.S.), para. 29.
169. See Franck & Fox, supra note 154, at 16 ("Our deference to the primary
authority of the political branches, of course, yields most readily when the political
branches themselves seek our assistance and invoke the judicial power in the course
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According to O'Connor,
Domestic courts may show deference to the Executive by enacting
legislation creating or consenting to the creation of such tribunals.
The political branches in our country have obviously judged that
they further America's foreign interests. To the extent that these
new tribunals necessitate the involvement of the federal judiciary,
Congress and the President are in effect seeking judicial
involvement in these matters. Further deference is paid to the
Executive by negotiating and approving treaties and agreements
that create transnational tribunals and prescribe relationships with
our domestic courts. The political branches of our govermuent are
asking the judiciary to refuse to abstain from its usual adjudicatory
function. 70

Moreover, the executive could have treated the Breardproblem as a
question of the highest importance, but instead, as was stated before
the World Court, it deferred to the judicial branch. The Supreme
Court did not seem to share in this opinion, as it was awaiting the

answer of the Solicitor General, who responded that the I.C.J. order
was not binding under international law."

There are several

implications arising from this statement. First, this departs from the
international legal rule. Second, the letter could have explained to
the Supreme Court the importance of the case before the I.C.J. and

the need to comply with international treaty obligations, which would
have signaled to the Supreme Court how foreign affairs are
implicated. The information of the Solicitor General is usually given
great deference in cases involving foreign affairs.' Third, any benefit

of conducting foreign affairs.").
170. O'Connor, supra note 77, at 17.
171. See Richardson III, supra note 28, at 125 ("Pursuant to a request by the Court
for its views (an unusual request in death penalty cases), the Justice Department,
through the Solicitor-General, argued in a brief that the ICJ order did not justify
halting Breard's execution, nor did the treaty violations of the Vienna Convention
justify a new trial."); see also Damrosch, supra note 107, at 703 ("In
the
Tehran
Hostages case the U.S. Government repeatedly insisted on Iranian compliance with
the I.C.J.'s decision and referred to it when issues concerning the international
dispute arose in U.S. and foreign tribunals.") (footnotes omitted).
172. See Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) ("[B]ecause lower
courts had reached conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's actions
and, as the Solicitor General informed us, unless the Government acted by July 19,
1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach of the Executive
Agreement."); see also FALK, supra note 157, at 131. ("By order of the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General [has been] invited to express the views of the United
States on [certain] litigation.").
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derived from the statement will likely be short-lived. Nevertheless, it
might endanger the U.S. position as a litigant in pending and future
cases before the World Court,173 and, in turn, produce other
disadvantages. 7 The executive will interfere when necessary. It may
interfere to clarify international legal questions or to protect foreign
affairs interests.
U.S. v. Pink illustrates judicial deference to the executive. In
Pink, the Court held "that the conduct of foreign relations is
committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the

Federal Government; that the propriety of the exercise of that power
is not open to judicial inquiry."'75 The Court upheld the Litvinov
Agreement, as its political relevance was underlined by the executive,
despite New York's argument that enforcement of decrees based on

the agreement is contrary to the public policy of the state.176 Pink
"confers upon the executive decision-maker the primary
responsibility for determining the jurisdictional relevance of
contending public order systems."'"

Breard and Pink together

suggest that had the executive proffered the I.C.J. case and treated
negotiations with Paraguay as important, the Supreme Court would

173. See Damrosch, supra note 107, at 703 ("Because the United States has been a
frequent litigant at the I.C.J. (both as applicant and as respondent) and is currently
before the Court in several other cases, such potential consequences should not be
ignored.").
174. See B. H. Oxman, Jurisdictionand Power to Indicate ProvisionalMeasures, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 333 (ed. Lori Fiscler
Damrosch ed., 1987). According to Oxman,
Whether or not theoretically binding, provisional measures have real effects.
A government that does not respect the measures may risk the following
consequences, among others:
-if it loses the case on the merits, liability for damages for losses
suffered by the opposing party during the interim period;
-weakening the credibility of its respect for law, including its ability to
encourage respect for law by foreign states as well as its own citizens;
-increasing the likelihood of criticism from foreign states directly or in
the form of U.N. action;
-weakening the legitimacy of its bargaining posture and deepening its
dispute with the other party;
-increasing the probability that the other party may resort to self-help;
-weakening the fabric of international institutions on which it, along
with other states, relies to maintain international order.
Id.
175. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,222-23 (1942).
176. See id. at 223.
177. FALK, supra note 157, at 62.
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have shown deference.
As mentioned above, this case might easily have reciprocal
effects concerning U.S. citizens abroad. Here, the stance amounted
to renouncing the authority of the President. Unlike the usual and
accepted practice, the stance was not intended to protect U.S. citizens
abroad."'
The U.S. government could have adopted a policy of "political
internalization," which "[o]ccurs when the political elites accept an
international norm and advocate its adoption as a matter of
government policy."7 ' The World Court ordered the United States to
undertake "all necessary measures at its disposal." However,
separation of powers as a constitutional structural limitation was not
the reason for the U.S. government's non-compliance with the order.
Another implication, as seen through the system of checks and
balances, is that foreign affairs issues can be properly protected and
solved by the activism of the courts. If all branches act as one and the
judiciary does not refrain from its usual adjudicatory function, foreign
affairs interests can be protected by the courts themselves."s
However, this is not a novel concept, as courts have tried to protect
foreign affairs issues and the interests of the nation as a whole
before, 8 ' by speaking with one voice. This principle was first
introduced in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers," and
confirmed and broadened by Baker v. Carr: "The cases concerning
war or foreign affairs, for example, are usually explained by the
necessity of the country's speaking with one voice in such matters."' '
In accordance with precedent, the Supreme Court should have
undertaken a "searching scrutiny" of state actions affecting U.S.
foreign relations that may provoke consequences for the nation as a
178. See Vazquez, supra note 83, at 689 ("It was not that long ago that President

Clinton relied at least in part on the need to protect U.S. citizens abroad in defending
his decision to launch a military intervention in Haiti in the face of congressional
opposition and without even a plausible claim that the threat to U.S. citizens there

amounted to any sort of emergency.").
179. Koh, supra note 68, at 641.

180. See Sandra Day O'Connor, supra note 77, at 17.
181. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 107 S.Ct. 347 (1986);
People of Saipan, 502 F.2d 90; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84

S. Ct. 923 (1964); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
182. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 556 (1959) ("For the
effective exercise of this control it was necessary that the Government speak with one

voice when regulating commercial intercourse with foreign nations.").
183. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,281 (1962).
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whole. Such scrutiny should have extended both to the issues under
the Vienna Convention and to the new considerations deriving from
the I.C.J.'s ruling on provisional measures.'"
Therefore, in Breard, the Supreme Court may have taken this
obligation into account on its own in order to protect the
international interests and reputation of the United States.
B. The Federal and State Governments: Federalism
The exclusive state jurisdiction arguably prevented the federal
government from interfering in Breard's execution. The United
States claimed before the I.C.J. that domestic restraints of federalism
left the federal government without effective remedies for dealing
with the issue. However, one finds that there were ways for the
executive to effectuate the request of the I.C.J. as a matter of foreign
policy.
Missouri v. Holland8 . ruled that the federal government has
exclusive authority in foreign affairs, and that the states'
constitutional prerogatives cannot limit the U.S. government from
undertaking
and
enforcing
international
obligations.
"[C]ongressional authority regarding foreign affairs and treaty
enforcement has long been thought to be far less vulnerable to
federalism-based challenges than domestic legislation . . . .'8

This

rule was confirmed by subsequent decisions as well as by the
Restatement."" In Pink, the Court stated that "power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively.""' This attitude, however, was not new, as it
was announced in earlier decisions, such as Chae Chan Ping,'
& '9 and Belmont.9'
Curtiss-Wright

Another of those decisions is Zscherning v. Miller, which
underscored the supremacy of the federal government in foreign
184. See Damrosch, supra note 107, at 703.
185. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,40 S.Ct. 382 (1920).
186. Vazquez, supra note 83, at 687.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1986).
188. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233.
189. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 ("For local interests the several States of the

Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relation with foreign nations,
we are but one people, one nation, one power.").
190. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304.
191. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).

1999]

The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions

affairs matters by finding states' intrusion into the fields of foreign
affairs unconstitutional."n The similarity of Zscherning and Breard
lies in state performance contrary to the foreign affairs of the U.S. as
a whole. The Supreme Court held an Oregon statute unconstitutional
as it intruded on an area reserved for the President and Congress."n
In Breard, the Court deferred to the state's jurisdiction. Also, both
cases included the legal interests of aliens and their protection under
a foreign affairs shield. The powers of the President in foreign affairs
showed a considerable expansion with respect to the other two
The control of foreign
branches of the federal government."
relations has been determined to be in the hands of the federal
government. One of the reasons is that "state and local activities may
sometimes directly impede or frustrate national foreign policy or
embarrass our foreign relations by causing offense or injury to foreign
nations, their citizens, and their economic interests."' 95 If a certain
issue falls within the area of foreign affairs, the executive has the right
to interfere in order to follow constitutional requirements and enable
the nation to speak with one voice. If the threat to U.S. international
obligations is imminent, the rationale for interference is even
stronger. The Breard matter clearly involved imminent danger and
injury to U.S. treaty obligations.
Arguing before the I.C.J., the U.S. government showed
deference to state authorities in Breard,which was not sustainable, or
at least not reasonable.'96 In addition, such an argument is
192. See Zscherning v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). In Zscherning, an Oregon
probate statute provided for escheat of a decedent's property in preference to a
nonresident alien's claim to inherit it unless the alien's country allowed U.S. citizens
to inherit under similar circumstances, allowed U.S. citizens to receive payment here
of funds inherited there, and gave foreign heirs the right to receive the proceeds of
Oregon estates without confiscation. Id. at 430-31. The Supreme Court struck down
the statute, finding that Oregon probate and appellate judges were basing their
decisions on "foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war."' Id.

at 437.
193. See generally Frederick L. Kirgis, Agora: Breard, Zscherning v. Miller and the
Breard Matter,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1998).
194. See generally Nathan J. Diament, Foreign Relations and Our Domestic
Constitution:Broadening the Discourse, 30 CONN. L. REv. 911; see also HAROLD H.
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSITUTION 96 (1990).
195. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 821, 827 (1989).
196. See William J. Aceves, Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Paraguay v. United States), Provisional Measures Order, International
Court of Justice, April 9, 1998, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 523 (1998) ("Entrusting the
final decision on compliance with treaty obligations and provisional measures
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inconsistent with both U.S. and international law. Federal authority
dealing with foreign affairs issues preempts state authority.' 97 Still,
the U.S. Secretary of State told the Governor of Virginia that the

execution of Breard would involve foreign policy implications and
expose the federal government to possible violations of international

law and embarrassment.

That was definitively correct and in

accordance with well-established practice.

Although the United

States used the constitutionally mandated issue of federalism as a
reason to not comply with the I.C.J. order and take responsibility for

Virginia's violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
it still acted adversely. Structural limitations of this kind would not
prevent it from acting this way. Moreover, it was legally empowered
to go further and demand the stay of execution as interfering with
foreign policy.198 The letter"9 itself looked more like an inducement
based on the statement of facts rather than a request.2

The U.S.

government again did not use all means at its disposal to prevent the
execution and consequent grave violations of international
instruments. 20'
However, the Governor of Virginia did not act in accordance
with the letter. Balancing the local enforcement of criminal justice
and the seemingly non-mandatory rulings of the I.C.J., he chose to
protect the former. The conduct of foreign affairs is not in the

governor's competence while the local criminal jurisdiction certainly
is. Still, he must have foreseen the consequences. "[S]hould the
International Court resolve this matter in Paraguay's favor, it would
be difficult having delayed the execution so that the International

ordered by the I.C.J. to state rather than federal authorities is disquieting.").
197. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 134, at 675 ("Conventional wisdom tells
us that this country's federal structure is irrelevant to the national Government's
exercise of its foreign relations power.").
198. See infra Part II.C.
199. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Execution of Foreigner, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1998, at A14.
200. See Charney & Reisman, supra note 101, at 673 ("The 'measures at [the
United States'] disposal under our Constitution may in some cases include only
persuasion-such as the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of Virginia to
stay Breard's execution-and not the legal compulsion through the judicial system.").
201. See Henkin, supra note 104, at 680-81 ("The Department of Justice did not
take other measures to obtain compliance by the state of Virginia with the treaty
obligation of the United States to stay the execution ....
[T]he President (the
executive branch) was obliged to make stronger, 'mandatory' representations to the
Governor of Virginia, stressing the legal obligation of the United States to stay the
execution, and the constitutional duty of the Governor to act on that obligation.").
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Court could consider the case to then carry out the jury's sentence
despite the rulings [of] the International Court."2m Nevertheless, the
governor ordered Breard's execution.
U.S. arguments of this kind rely largely on the fact that the
federal government does not interfere with states' criminal justice
systems. However, there have been times when the executive branch
has made substantive impact on state criminal justice in the name of
foreign affairs and international law. For instance, one incident
involved the United Kingdom, Germany, the Council of Europe, the
United States, and a German national, Jens Soering.' Soering was
charged with capital murder in the U.S. state of Virginia. There was a
high probability of a death sentence. By that time, he had already
managed to escape. According to the 1972 Treaty on Extradition
between the United Kingdom and the United States, the United
Kingdom was about to extradite Soering to the United States so that
he could be tried in a Virginia criminal court.2 4 However, the United
Kingdom is a member of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,. 5 which, in Article 3,
forbids, inter alia, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The European court found that extradition under these
circumstances would amount to a violation of Article 3, as Soering
would be put on death row. The court found that the death row
dynamic, which was inevitable if he had been sentenced to death,
amounted to forbidden treatment. The United Kingdom was in a
position to violate one of its international obligations, either to the
United States or to the other members of the European Convention.
The U.S. federal government guaranteed the United Kingdom that
Soering would not be prosecuted for capital murder in the Virginia
state court and hence the imposition of the death penalty was
removed. In a diplomatic letter written on July 31, 1989, U.S.
202. Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement
by Governor Jim Gilmor Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998),
in Charney & Reisman, supra note 101, at 674-75.
203. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 439. This case was instituted
before the European Court of Human Rights by Soering, who was waiting for
extradition to the United States.
204. See Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 129 (1991);
see also, Diane Marie Amman, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201, 1295 n.310
(1998).
205. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3,1953,213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S.
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authorities made assurances that U.S. laws, in accordance with the
1972 Extradition Treaty, would prohibit the applicants from being
prosecuted for capital murder in Virginia.'
As the threat of the death penalty was eliminated,' the United
Kingdom eventually extradited Soering to the United States. The
executive branch demonstrated an influence on a state's criminal
justice system when foreign relations or international law questions
demanded such action. The similarity of the Breardand Soering cases
is striking. "The Soering case provides a sensational example of how
a state law prosecution can implicate the foreign affairs of the United
States and subject a state's standards of criminal justice to legal
inquiry in a human rights tribunal."2 It also shows how the federal
government can successfully intervene.
Moreover, in Soering's
diplomatic incident, the United States was not in violation of the
treaty, whereas in Breard, violations of international law were at
stake.
C. Executive Orders and Executive Agreements
The President could have issued an executive order using federal

authority to stop the execution.'

It would not have greatly intruded

upon the states' constitutional prerogatives as the order might have

206. See Appendix to Resolution DH (90) 8, Mar. 12 1990, in Information Sheet
No. 26 (Council of Europe), at 116.
207. See ExtraditionAllowed, WASH. PoST, Nov. 22,1989, at B7 ("Bedford County
Commonwealth's Attorney Jim Updike agreed to downgrade the charge to firstdegree murder.").
208. Ronan Doherty, ForeignAffairs v. Federalism:How State Control of Criminal
Law Implicates FederalResponsibility Under InternationalLaw, 82 VA. L. REV. 1281,
1303 (1996).
209. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 58, at 353. According to Ordonez and
Reilly,
[i]n Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the plaintiffs
challenged an executive regulation requiring Iranian post-secondary
students in the United States to register their residence and maintain nonimmigrant status. The regulation was issued in response to the continuing
hostage crisis in Iran. In order to uphold the regulation, the appellate court
had to find a rational basis for the Executive Branch's actions. The court
used the I.C.J. decision as preclusive on the issue of whether Iran's actions in
the hostage situation violated international law, declaring that "the
lawlessness of this conduct of the Iranian government was recognized by the
decision of the World Court." Iran's conduct was construed to provide the
rational basis necessary for the court to find the regulation within the
Attorney General's authority and to uphold its constitutionality."
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been limited to a temporary postponement. "The Constitution leaves
the resolution of such an issue [i.e., the international obligation to
comply with a provisional measures
210 order,] largely to the elected
officials in the federal government.,
An executive agreement between the United States and
Paraguay was also an option. Such an act would have been given
protection under the Supremacy Clause, avoiding possible challenges
under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. n
Diplomatic negotiations could have prevented the negative
consequences of this incident and ended it before it reached the
World Court. Diplomatic means for settling disputes are seen as an
effective and desirable remedy.
Negotiations and diplomatic
relations are without doubt within the province of the executive,
where it is expected to show skill, speed and professionalism in
protecting national interests.
The executive should have undertaken steps to internalize the
provisional measures order, rather than proclaiming its legal
ineffectiveness." ' There were several ways to accomplish this by
using exclusive executive prerogatives. "[The President] possesses
the whole Executive power.... He is charged to execute the laws. A
treaty is... a law. He must, then, execute a treaty, where, he, and he
alone, possesses the means of executing. '' 1 The reasons for not using
executive prerogatives can be found only in political considerations.
The executive probably did not see the protection of Paraguay, its

210. Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 134, at 678.
211. The Missouriv. Holland Court ruled that treaties cannot be challenged under
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920). The executive agreements gained Supremacy Clause protection over time.
U.S. courts have treated some executive agreements dealing with the position of
individuals as treaties. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
212. See Koh, supra note 68, at 645. Koh argues as follows:
At that point, the Nicaraguans shifted from an international interpretive
forum-the World Court-to a domestic enforcement forum: the U.S.
Congress, where resolutions were introduced terminating future aid to the
Contras for activities that violated the World Court's ruling. In other words,
Congress internalized the World Court's ruling into U.S. law. Almost
immediately thereafter, the Reagan Administration stopped mining the
harbors. In short, an interaction, interpretation, and internalization of an
international norm into domestic law helped force the United States into
obedience.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
213. Paul, supra note 76, at 690 (footnotes omitted).
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citizens, and international law as action beneficial to U.S. interests.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Constitutional Arguments
In the eyes of international law and the I.C.J., Virginia, its
governor, the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, and
the Secretary of State are agencies214 of the United States for which

the U.S. government is responsible on the international plane."5 In
214. See Henkin, supra note 104, at 681 ("The U.S. Supreme Court-an agency of
'the United States'-refused to order that the execution be stayed. The Governor of
Virginia-also, in law, in fact, 'acting for the United States'-clearly had authority to
stay the execution but refused to do so.").
215. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the U.N. International Law
Commission, which is considered to be the codification of customary international
law, confirms this rule:
Article 5 (Attribution to the State of the conduct of its organs)
For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State organ
having that status under the internal law of that State shall be
considered as an act of the State concerned under international law,
provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question.
Article 6 (Irrelevance of the position of the organ in the organization of the
State)
The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of
that State under international law, whether that organ belongs to the
constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its
functions are of an international or an internal character, and whether it
holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organization of the
State.
Article 7 (Attribution to the State of the conduct of other entities
empowered to exercise elements of government authority)
1. The conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a
State shall also be considered as an act of that State under international
law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in
question.
2. The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal
structure of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is
empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity
in the case in question.
37 I.L.M. 440 (Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n
1998).
Roberto Ago, who was a special rapporteur, explained the exact meaning of the
territorial unit, as envisaged in the present Draft Articles. The territorial unit of the
State comprises municipality, province, region, canton, federal unit, autonomous
administration of dependant territory, etc. See Roberto Ago, Third Report on the
Responsibility of States, YILCIII 33 (1976).
For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Verdross, Theorie der Mittelbaren
Staatenhaftung, in OSTERREISHISCHE ZCITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT, 338
(vol. 1 1948).
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the absence of any provision to the contrary, international
conventions are to be applied to the entire territory of state parties.216
States may include federal clauses in treaties, but due to
constitutional restraints, it is impossible to fully implement treaty
provisions into state jurisdictions and thereby impose responsibility
for the acts of federal units. The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations does not contain any federal restrictions.
Steps that were undertaken by the executive, moreover, were
inconsistent. The first inconsistency was displayed in the actions
before the World Court and within the domestic arena. The second
set of contradictory steps took place in the area of structural
limitations, emanating from different acts toward the Supreme Court
and the State of Virginia.
The executive branch, as the sole organ of international
relations, could have shown stronger determination in following the
rule of law in the international arena, and more activism in the
domestic arena, in order to reconcile differing demands. The
horizontal legal order might have been respected in the vertically
structured national order. The executive could have pursued the
protection of international law independently from the other
branches of the federal government by issuing an order, initiating
diplomatic negotiations, or trying to reach an executive agreement
that would have been enforceable in the courts without direct
interference with the judicial branch. On the other hand, the
executive could have interfered with the proceeding more directly: it
was invited by the Court to state the relevance of the case before the
I.C.J. The Solicitor General's letter indicating the binding character
of the order would have been a sufficient pledge of the United States'
commitment to international law before the I.C.J. The executive
could have used the rhetoric of "expediency discourse," '17 invoking
both the urgency that had arisen from Breard and the ongoing
diplomatic negotiations with Paraguay. The expediency argument
would have shown the Supreme Court that an unfavorable judgment
would interfere with foreign affairs. Unfortunately, the executive's
measures went the opposite direction and contributed to the

216. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art 26.
217. See Paul, supra note 76, at 711 ("Expediency discourse justified the
executive's intervention in the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction.

In effect, the

executive now stood as the gatekeeper to the judicial process in cases challenging
foreign laws.").
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international law violations in the Breard drama.
IH. The Human Rights Argument
The way that international human rights arguments penetrate
into a domestic system is quite unique and important. Their strength,

as well as the firm consensus regarding their meaning, significance
and functions, enable them to have at least an indirect impact on
internal law. Reasons for supporting human rights arguments

originate from moral and progressive ideas, as well as from the
necessity to uniformly regulate all individuals as human beings.
These reasons stem from the concept of democracy. This argument is
weaker compared to ones previously analyzed. On the other hand, it

operates differently. Its structure makes it incompatible for direct
implementation, but the material elements and substantive strength
21
of such an argument may contribute to its considerable importance."

International human rights have been supported by U.S. courts
under the doctrine of customary international law. The existence of

such rules, fortified by the Alien Tort Claims Act and the willingness
of courts to hear and positively solve these types of cases, enabled the

resurrection of international custom in U.S. courts.219 Shifting the
problem from more formal elements to the idea of material justice
and human rights opens the door for its application. Moreover,
arguments put forward in favor of jus cogens, or comity, resemble the
technique of customary international legal arguments.

218. The United States has failed to accept some of the major treaties for the
protection of human rights:
This ... shows that litigants rarely raise treaty-based human rights claims.
Moreover, when litigants do raise such claims, courts usually do not even
mention the NSE declarations. Out of fourteen cases in which litigants did
raise treaty-based human rights claims, only three judicial opinions mention
the NSE declaration, and in two of those cases the issue is relegated to a
single footnote. In short, both advocates and judges have failed to
appreciate the possibilities for judicial application of human rights treaties to
which the United States is a party.
David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 203 (1999)
(footnotes omitted). On this point, see also FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 64, at
353.
219. See Filatriga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74
F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
modified by 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp.
246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated by 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787 (D.C. Kan. 1980).
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I first examine the human rights issues opened in Breard since
the I.C.J. order did not address these questions directly. These issues
might be seen as part of a larger framework and as one of the
problems opened by the whole diplomatic incident and the mere
existence of these cases.' Human rights issues in Breard might go
unnoticed in the sea of other arguments. The issues could be divided
into several specific rights, such as the right to life, the right to a fair
trial, the right to access a consul, and the freedom from the denial of
justice.
Human rights issues received greater acceptance and
understanding regarding the issuance of the provisional measures in
LaGrand, which was decided before the I.C.J. a year after Breard.
Germany instituted proceedings against the United States before the
I.C.J. on March 2, 1999, alleging violations of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. The facts of the proceeding are almost
identical to the those in Breard. The I.C.J. unanimously issued a
provisional measures order on March 3rd obliging the United States
to do what it was supposed to do in the Breard matter-stay the
execution. " Humanitarian considerations seemed to be clearer this
time, as was indicated in the declaration of Judge Oda, appended to
the order. He disagreed with the court's finding to a large extent, but
decided to vote in favor of it exclusively for humanitarian reasons.'
Although the I.C.J. did not refer to this question in the operative
part of the order, it indirectly dealt with these issues by mentioning
human rights in its reasoning. ' This aspect itself might have helped

220. See Richardson III, supra note 28, at 121 ("When the Commonwealth of
Virginia executed Angel Breard on April 14, 1998, the United States violated

international law. The rule of law in the international community was affronted in
several ways by the outpouring of official dualsim throughout all phases of this case,
particularlyregardinghuman rights and the respect due decisions of the International
Court of Justice....") (emphasis added).

221. See General List No. 104, Mar. 3, 1999, Press Communiqu6 99/9, availableat
<http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/I.C.J.wwv/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm>.
222. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Mar. 3 1999 ("I reiterate and emphasize that I

voted in favour of the Order solely for humanitarian reasons.") (Oda, J., concurring),
availableat <http:/www.I.C.J.-cij.org/I.C.J.www/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm>.
223. Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Para. v. U.S.),

para. 8. The opinion states as follows:
Whereas, in its request for the indication of provisional measures of
protection . . . it emphasizes that "[t]he importance and sanctity of an
individual human life are well established in international law" and "[a]s
recognized by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, every human being has the inherent right to life and this right shall
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the U.S. courts to see the order in another light.'
"Reference to
judgments or advisory opinions of the I.C.J. and P.C.I.J. has on the
whole been motivated by criteria of expediency, whether political
(the interest of the government) or economic (the interest of the
nationals), but sometimes also, it would appear, by humanitarian
considerations."22s The U.S. courts showed respect for the I.C.J.
decisions in the light of humanitarian considerations in Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina.26 The courts analyzed the character
of jus cogens norms in the area of human rights invoking I.C.J.
decisions.'7

Humanitarian considerations can raise this issue indirectly and
separately, since human rights issues were not treated in depth by any
of the courts in the Breardmatter. Domestic courts may depart from

the traditional horizontal aspect of international law when human
rights are at stake.

The internal configuration of human rights

inevitably establishes a vertical structure. Therefore, this issue can be
viewed in the context of international law in domestic systems and
individual rights:
This is the domestic constitutional argument. A similar one can
be made in the international context. While it is sometimes said
that international law falls outside the scope of the judicial function
or expertise, this depends on how one conceives of international
law. When international law protects individual rights against
be protected by law;" . . . provisional measures are urgently needed to

protect the life of Paraguay's national and the ability of this Court to order
the relief to which Paraguay is entitled: restitution in kind.
Id.
224. Provisional measures can be also seen as a humanitarian device, trying to
prevent irreparable harm to human rights. See generally, Rosalyn Higgins, Interim
Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, in: Politics, Values and Functions:
InternationalLaw in the 21st Century 87 (Jonathan I.Charney, Donald K. Anton &
Mary Ellen O'Connel eds, 1997).
225. Bedjaoui, supra note 44, at 62-63 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
226. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
227. Id. at 715. The court stated as follows:
The universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by
Nuremberg-rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts,
are the direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental norms recognized
as jus cogens. In the words of the International Court of Justice, these
norms, which include "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person," are the concern of all states; "they are obligations-erga
omnes." The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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governments, then enforcement of international law falls squarely
within the traditional notion of judicial responsibility.

If one accepts a vertical approach to international law-that
individuals have fights against states that are protected by
international norms-then domestic courts are the best vehicles for
adjudicating those cases with strong vertical elements.M

The mere fact that this case raised issues of international concern
involving the international court and other countries, as well as the
rules of international law, may diminish the concept of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction. This fact, standing alone, may compel courts to
depart from provincialism. 9
The right to life is the most important of all human rights, and
the source of all other personal rights. Commitment to a society
founded on the recognition of human rights requires valuing this
right. Respect for life on the international plane is necessary.' On
the other hand, the death penalty cannot be seen as contrary under
international law. The death penalty is a legitimate state actioni23'
Although all members of the Council of Europe and European Court
for Human Rights abolished the death penalty as a denial of the right
to life, their stance is not based on general international law, but on a
particular treaty obligation-Protocol IV of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

228. Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2308 (footnotes omitted).
229. See Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110, 1125-1127 (1982).
230. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, art. 4.2, O.A.S.
Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2,213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (1953);
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981, art. 4, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). Customary international law protects this
right as well, and some declarations are the proof of the binding effect of this
customary rule, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G. A.
Res. 217A (11I), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
231. See Bekker & Highet, supra note 3, at 38 ("At the same time, the [I.C.J.]
made it clear that the case does not concern the right of U.S. federal states to resort
to the death penalty and that the Court's function is to resolve international legal
disputes between sovereign states and not to act as a universal supreme court of
criminal appeal.").
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Freedoms.l 2
The performance of state functions and the right to life can be
seen as relative concepts that demand more careful examination and
a balancing test, since none of those principles is absolute and
unconditional. They cannot be treated as isolated and distinct
categories because they are deeply interconnected. The right to life is
faced with certain restrictions, and its antithesis, the death penalty, is
faced with analogous requirements. Due to a right to life, strict
scrutiny must be applied in examining impositions of a death
sentence.23 All necessary elements must be present in order to justify
the deprivation of someone's life, which also includes international
standards. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), interpreting the
ICCPR, has reached a consistent approach:
Members [of the ICCPR] have comprehensively dealt with all
facets of this matter including the six express limitations on the
imposition and implementation of a sentence of death. Such a
sentence (a) may only be imposed for the most serious crimes; (b)
must be in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime; (c) must not be contrary to the other
provisions of the Covenant or the Genocide Convention; (d) can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court; (e) shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below 18 years of age and shall not be carried out on
pregnant women; (f) any person sentenced to death shall have the
right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. 23
If international standards are not met, even while domestic
requirements are fulfilled, the focus shifts from constitutional,
criminal, and procedural issues to the right to life seen on the
232. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3,1953,213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5.
233. See General Comment 6(16), Doc. A/37/40, para. 6, Doc. CCPR/CI21/Add.1
(adopted by the HRC at its 378th meeting, July, 1982). According to the HRC,

While it follows from article 6(2) and (6) that States parties are not obliged

to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in

particular, to abolish it for other than the "most serious crimes."
Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws in this
light and, in any event, to restrict the application of the death penalty to the

"most serious crimes." The article also refers generally to abolition in terms
which strongly suggest (paras. (2) and (6)) that abolition is desirable.

Id.
234. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

332 (1994) (emphasis added).
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international plane. In Breard,one finds deficiencies in the criminal
procedure that resulted in the imposition and execution of the death
penalty. Not only did the sentence arguably violate international
law, but also the conviction of Breard lacked certain procedural
requirements necessary for the protection of the accused. Breard's
right to access to a consul practically amounted to the right to a fair
trial, which is the international standard of the U.S. concept of due
process of law. The issue here can be expanded, since international
law regulates the minimum of procedural requirements regarding
aliens. The Court might have seen the violation of international
procedural safeguards as the violation of due process under the U.S.
Constitution. In that case, there is a demand for strict scrutiny as the
violation of the international procedural safeguards risks
international affairs.'s
Both United States law and international law protect the right to
access to a consul. Moreover, when a foreign national faces judicial
proceedings in a foreign country, several basic human rights are
implicated including the right to due process, adequate counsel, and
guaranteed by the U.S.
an interpreter. Many of these rights are also
6
courts.1
U.S.
by
enforced
and
Constitution
Another element supporting the argument that the international
procedural requirement should have been seen as a violation of due
process is the violation of Articles 6(2) and 15 of the ICCPR 7
235. See generally Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal
Justice: Identifying InternationalProceduralProtections and Equivalent Protections
in NationalConstitutions,3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (1993).

236. See Victor M. Uribe, Consuls as Work" Universal Instruments of Human
Rights and ConsularProtection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 375,378 (1997).
237. Article 6(2) states:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, a sentence of death

may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law
in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the
provisions of the present covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried

out pursuant to a final judgement of a competent court.
Id. art 6(2). Article 15(1) states,
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If,
subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the

imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
Id. art. 15(1).
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prohibiting the retroactive application of laws that disadvantage
individuals in criminal cases. The violation of this requirement by the
United States deprived Breard of the ability to raise his claim in the
federal courts. The ex post facto law cannot be applied after the
proceeding has already commenced. Breard could have raised a
habeas corpus claim in the federal courts when the proceeding started
in 1992. When the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
came into force in 1996, he could no longer file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus when the case reached the federal courts. Moreover,
he could have used this claim in state courts but he did not know of
this possibility. Since Breard's U.S. counsel did not raise this issue in
the state courts, nor did they tell him of his right to obtain counsel, he
was obviously advised improperly. One of the possible options for
the courts was to take into account that he had been inadequately
represented. The initial violation of Article 6(2) of the ICCPR
developed a vicious circle ending in another international breach Breard's execution. "Ex injuria jus oritur" accurately describes the
defense argument of the United States before the I.C.J.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that even if Breard had had
access to a consul, it would not have changed his position or sentence.
The Court further stated that "[w]ithout a hearing, Breard cannot
establish how the Consul would have advised him, how the advice of
his attorneys differed from the advice the Consul could have
provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject the plea
bargain that the State offered him." 8 In Lombera-Camorlinga,the
Ninth Circuit set aside the marijuana conviction of a Mexican
national and instructed the district judge to determine whether the
officers' failure to notify the man of his consular rights had harmed
his defense. 3 9 This case was decided after Breard and clearly shows
that the right of access to a consul is an important procedural right of
a defendant. In Lombera, the court ruled that the violation of the
right to consul had to be remedied.
Breard had the right under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights,24 and customary international law regulating the diplomatic

238. Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355.
239. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F. 3d. at 1244.
240. Uribe, supra note 236, at 401 ("[M]any of the ICCPR's general provisions
provide consuls with an international legal basis for protection of their nationals.").
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protection over aliens24 to have a consul's advice and a fair trial.242
International law conceives that an important element of a fair trial,
when the proceeding includes aliens, is the right to have the advice of
a consul. "The right to consular protection has, at its origin, the basic
right of an individual to enjoy protection while in a foreign state."243
The refusal of due process or a fair trial to aliens represents denial of
justice.2" "[T]he customary right to freedom from 'denial of justice'
should have been addressed and should have prevailed [in Breard]. ' 45
This may represent a separate and distinct ground for responsibility
under international law. The denial of justice is a different argument
than one based on the violation of the Vienna Convention. A denial
of justice can exist even when no treaty has been violated. This
argument is connected with the treatment of aliens under general
international law.
The rights to a fair trial, diplomatic protection, and the advice of
a consul naturally fit together. They establish the international
procedural due process standard. They also enable the appropriate
protection of individuals by both the forum state and the alien's state.
Aliens may not know the language of the forum state or understand
the domestic laws or remedies. The right of access to a consul serves
to balance the inadequate position of aliens and, consequently,
equalizes them with nationals of the forum state. The right to a fair
241. This is a principle of international law applicable to nationals of one state
within the jurisdiction of another state, based on the bond of nationality. "[W]hat the
Law of Nations really does concerning individuals is to impose upon all States the
duty to grant certain privileges to such foreign Heads of States and diplomatic
envoys, and certain rights to such foreign citizens [when in the territory of the foreign
state]." H. Lauterpacht, Lauterpacht's Revision of Oppenheim, in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Louis B. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds., 1975).
242. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
323 (1988).
243. Uribe, supra note 236, at 390.
244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES § 711, cmt. a (1986). According to the Restatement,
Any injury to an alien for which a state is responsible under this chapter has
sometimes been characterized as a "denial of justice." More commonly the
phrase "denial of justice" is used narrowly, to refer only to injury consisting
of, or resulting from, denial of access to courts, or denial of procedural
fairness and due process in relation to judicial proceedings, whether criminal
or civil. As regards natural persons, most injuries that in the past would
have been characterized as "denials of justice" are now subsumed as human
rights violations under clause (a) [of this section].
Id.
245. Paust, supra note 81, at 692.
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trial is applicable to individuals regardless of their nationality.246
"Foreign defendants should be'' entitled
to the same due process
7
considerations as U.S. nationals. 2
The death penalty, as such, is not the issue here. The core
humanitarian issue is how the death penalty was imposed on Breard.
The violation of human rights, as well as thwarting the diplomatic
protection of Paraguay, show deficiencies with respect to
international standards. This casts a shadow on the death penalty
decision. The right to life is not violated because of the existence of
the death penalty. In Breard, the right to life was violated because of
the way in which the death sentence was imposed and executed. The
violations of other human rights, such as the right to access to a
consul, the right to a fair trial, and others, are separate human rights
issues. However, their sole existence generates arguments that prove
the violation of the right to life through the imposition of a death
sentence that was invalid under international law.
The violation of these individual rights, as regulated on the
international plane, can be viewed domestically either as a possible
defense in the criminal proceeding or as a matter of international
concern underlined by the existence of the I.C.J. order.m Moreover,
Asakura v. City of Seattle 9 shows that a treaty violation can provide a
defense in court proceedings.
In any case, where a defendant in a civil or criminal proceeding
initiated by the government invokes a human rights treaty as a
defense to the government's charges, the court should reach the
merits of the defendant's claim unless the claim is frivolous, relief is
available under some other provision of domestic law, or an
alternative forum is available in which to adjudicate the claim.
Failure to reach the merits of the claim in such cases would be
246. See Uribe, supra note 236, at 376. According to Uribe,

Criminal prosecution in a foreign country could significantly reduce the
possibility of a fair trial. The danger multiplies for defendants not fluent in
the local language or whose understanding of the foreign legal system is
lacking. The picture becomes more threatening in countries where the
prosecution may still impose the death penalty.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
247. Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 77 (1991).
248. See Sloss, supra note 218, at 213 ("Thus, in cases where a defendant seeks to
invoke a human rights treaty as a defense to civil or criminal charges brought by the
government, courts should not construe the NSE declarations to violate U.S. treaty
obligations, if another possible construction remains .") (footnotes omitted).
249. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
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inconsistent with the CharmingBetsy principle.20
Another possible approach to the human rights issue in Breardis
through the jus cogens concept. If any peremptory international
human right was violated, this would be the most direct way to
introduce human rights issues into Breard. Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua left the door open for the direct
"Such basic norms of
implementation of jus cogens norms:
international law as the proscription against murder and slavery may
well have the domestic legal effect that appellants suggest. That is,
they may well restrain our government in the same way that the
Constitution restrains it."' ' 1
Due to procedural deficiencies, Breard's execution may
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life. The arbitrariness can be
found in the denial of justice, since international legal requirements
were not fulfilled. Breard was not given the protection regarding the
procedural safeguards to which he was entitled under international
law. Courts might decide that jus cogens prevents an arbitrary taking
of life and, therefore, U.S. domestic law would be displaced by jus
cogens. Another question is whether the death penalty violates
peremptory international law.52
U.S. domestic legal remedies seemingly fall short of protecting
human rights in this context. On the other hand, one cannot help but
think that the deficiencies regarding the respect of international
human rights were not enough to turn the balancing test in another
direction, and enable a stay of the execution. Carrying out the death
sentence, despite these humanitarian considerations, amounted to
irreparable harm, which had triggered the I.C.J. provisional measures
order.253
The human rights argument seems to remain exclusively an
international argument. The fact that human rights violations were
part of the international law issues in this case was not enough for the
United States. Other aspects of the U.S. conduct in Breard also blur
bona fide behavior and evince a lack of concern for human rightsthe urgent execution of an individual despite a vigorous international
250. See Sloss, supra note 218, at 214.
251. 859 F.2d at 941.
252. Professor Gormley has argued that the right to life in Article 6(1) of the
ICCPR represents jus cogens. See W. P. Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of
Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LHE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

120-59 (Ramcharan ed., 1985).

253. See Higgins, supra note 224, at 87.
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public protest and an apology for it, which had been offered before
the execution, as the only appropriate remedy.
This argument may lack domestic legal enforceability, but the
political implications, moral considerations, and preponderance of
several international human rights arguments could have given weight
to a fairly modest request-a stay of the execution. The courts
invoked several grounds that activate international human rights

arguments in Breard: international procedural due process (the right
of access to a consul, the prohibition of denial of justice to aliens, and
the right to a fair trial), the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life
(supported by jus cogens), and a treaty-based defense in criminal
cases. The courts could have shown more activism and a more
progressive attitude in examining these issues.

The U.S.

IV. The Comity Argument
Supreme Court itself noted the international

implications of Breard.

However, it addressed them indirectly

without any in-depth review." The dissenting opinions of Justices
Stevens and Breyer focused more on these problems, as they raised
the question of international concern, admitting the outbound impact
of the Court's decision and the fact that a competent international

forum was dealing with the same issue." This point might have been
a link to comity, which would have enabled the Court to deal with the
whole issue in a different way.
The international concern noted in Breard is without any doubt.
The foreign state, the International Court, and the foreign national
254. Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1355 ("It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us
while proceedings are pending before the I.C.J. that might have been brought to that
court earlier.").
"First, while we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of
an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to
interpret such..

."

Id. at 1354.

"The I.C.J. set a briefing schedule for this matter, with oral argument likely to
be held this November. Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas
corpus and a stay application in this Court in order to "enforce" the I.C.J.'s order."
Id. at 1354.
255. Justice Stevens stated, "[T]he international aspects of this case provide an
additional reason for adhering to our established rules and procedures." Id. at 1356
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stated, "At the same time, the international
aspects of the case have provided us with the advantage of additional briefing even in
the short time available. More time would likely mean additional briefing and
argument, perhaps, for example on the potential relevance of proceedings in an
international forum." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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were directly interested in the outcome of the proceeding.

State

members of the I.C.J., the U.N., and the Vienna Convention were
indirectly involved. All the actors, including the State of Virginia and
the executive branch, were waiting for the decision of the Court. The
implications certainly deserved a more cautious and tolerant
approach to the problem, with the possibility of showing the interestbalancing test, courtesy, and respect concomitant to the notion of
comity.
Comity is a well-known concept in public international law. 6
However, I am going to use the rhetoric of comity as used in U.S.
jurisprudence, which the courts have used to give respect and
deference to foreign and international law and the courts. In this
case, comity might have been used by the Court to show deference to
the interpretation of international law by the international court.'

If

all other means failed, comity would still be able to bridge the gap
between the I.C.J. and the U.S. Supreme Court.'
Not only does comity have many meanings, it also has many
models and functions. Justice Storey made the distinction between

256. See H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-35 (1955).
257. Article 36 of the LC.J. Statute provides:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to
it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of
the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Id. Both general and special jurisdiction of the I.C.J. existed in Breard. General
jurisdiction was established by Article 36(2) while special jurisdiction was provided
by the Optional Protocol appended to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.
International courts have the power to give a binding interpretation of a treaty.
Examples include European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice.
258. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agora: Breard, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
708, 708 (1998) ("The Supreme Court should have honored this request as a matter
of judicial comity, offering the I.C.J. the same respect that U.S. courts are
increasingly according their counterparts around the world.").
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the "comity of courts" and the "comity of nations."' 9 Justice Scalia
identified the existence of "the comity of courts," as opposed to
legislative comity, in his dissenting opinion in HartfordFire Insurance
Co. v. California.' He stated as follows:
The "comity" they refer to is not the comity of courts. Judges
decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately
adjudged elsewhere. This might be termed "prescriptive comity,"
which is the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting
the reach of their laws. 261
In Breard, the Court need not have resolved this dilemma, as
both prescriptive and judicial comity would have connected the
I.C.J.'s decision and the ruling of the Supreme Court. This would
have favored the I.C.J. and the foreign subject. Comity would have
been used as a "bridge. 262 "As a bridge, comity is meant to expand
the role of public policy, public law, and international politics in
domestic courts."263
It is clear that the I.C.J. does not legislate, but it does interpret
the rules of the Vienna Convention and international laws in general.
The determination of the meaning and scope of the Vienna
Convention by the International Court of Justice would certainly
have prevailed over the corresponding interpretation by national
courts. The Supreme Court acknowledged the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction to
interpret the Vienna Convention: "[W]e should give respectful
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered
by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret ...,,26,
Judicial comity could also be applied here as a bridge, since, as
Justice Scalia stated, comity is when "judges decline to exercise
jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere."2'
The acceptance of the I.C.J.'s determination is supposed to be
motivated by its authority, not by its binding quality.' I.C.J. judges
are certainly experts in international law. Consequently, this forum
259.

JOSEPH STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 38,

(1834).

260. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

261. Id.
262. Paul, supra note 247, at 5-8.

263. Id.
at 7.
264. Breard,118 S. Ct. at 1354.
265. HartfordFire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. For more about the acceptance based on the authority of the decisio
regardless of its binding effect, see Schreuer, supra note 58, at 45.
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might be seen as a better place
to interpret the treaty as it relates to
267
party.
state
one
than
more
Acceptance of the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction through the compromisory
clause (Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention) should be seen
as a forum selection issue. The comity jurisprudence supporting the
enforcement of such clauses would support the Court's deference to
the I.C.J. with the same rationales and reasoning.
The application of an interest-balancing test would have shown
the benefits of the comity approach. "Interest balancing is intended
to measure the forum's interests against the likelihood that its
exercise of jurisdiction might offend a foreign sovereign or cause
hardship to a foreign party.' '2' The interest estimation can be
expanded to cover the international perspective as well, since comity
connects different legal systems, and in this case, it would not be
foreign and national, but national and international. There are three
different groups of interests-those of Paraguay, the United States,
and the international system.
A. Paraguay'sInterests
Paraguay has two interests of different legal character. The first
interest is with respect to consular relations, which also includes the
interest of the United States, as consular relations function on a
reciprocal basis. This interest is clearly of a public character, as
states' interests are directly involved. The second is the interest in
Breard, whose private interest became the state's interest due to the
nationality bond and the rule of diplomatic protection. Nevertheless,
such a private interest becomes public in cases before the I.C.J.
B. The United States' Interests
The position of the United States in the international legal
system would be fostered by showing respect for the international
rule of law. U.S. respect for international litigation and the
willingness of the U.S. courts to cooperate with international
tribunals would also be confirmed. There was no threat to U.S.
'
sovereignty, as this cooperation "does not import subordination."269
Furthermore, U.S. consular relations and U.S. consular protection of

267. See FALK, supra note 157, at 176 (1964).
268. Paul, supra note 247, at 61.

269. Slaughter, supranote 258, at 711.
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its citizens might be endangered by a reciprocal lack of respect by
foreign states. Not only Paraguay, but other countries as well, may
refuse to provide U.S. nationals with notification and access to
consuls when they are arrested. 70 Breard could have been an
example of respect for the rule of law and the importance of consular
protection for other countries. A more in-depth interest-balancing
test would have provided the Court with another perspective. "The
Supreme Court thus had little to lose, but much to gain."271
C. The International System's Interests
The I.C.J. has an interest in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Deference to the I.C.J.'s decision would not have gone further than to
stay the execution. This court was directly interested in compliance
with international treaties. Other state members of the court and the
Vienna Convention might be concerned about the functioning of the
international legal order.
Courts may use comity without special reference to this interestbalancing. "Guided by notions of comity, courts consider competing
foreign and domestic interests.2 72 Such a view was present in
NationalAirmotive v. Iran,273 where the court accepted the holding of
the I.C.J.'s decision in Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, (U.S.
v. Iran).274 Our suggestion is that deeper analysis in Breard would
have certainly discovered an interest in a different holding.V5
The modern trend of globalization has many facets. It should be
encouraged, especially when no threat to sovereignty exists.
Globalization inevitably introduces transparency which opens
270. See FALK, supra note 157, at 46 ("Reciprocity is closely related to the
horizontal conceptions of self-restraint and estoppel.... The relation of reciprocity
to estoppel is merely that it is difficult for an asserting state to challenge a similar
assertion by another state in the future.").
271. Id. at 712.
272. Paul, supra note 247, at 1 (footnote omitted).
273. National Airmotive v. Iran, 491 F. Supp. 555 (D.D.C. 1980).
274. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 21.
"It is
275. The Supreme Court made some policy-orientated reference:
unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending before
the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier." Breard, 118 S. Ct. at
1356. Its exact meaning is not quite clear. One possible explanation is that the Court
was balancing acting in good faith and interest with the motives of the actors in this
case. Otherwise, the time factor is without meaning for the Supreme Court because
it is highly unlikely that the Court would have decided differently if the case had been
brought before the I.C.J. earlier. Nevertheless, the interjudicial perspective existed
in this case.
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different ways of communicating and emphasizes the necessity for
stronger international ties. The Supreme Court's attitude resembles
an old-fashioned instinctive reaction to any kind of international
impact, even if it is benign and in the interest of many. Moreover, the
Supreme Court was not addressed directly by the I.C.J., nor could the
I.C.J. do that. These decisions are always left to the nation to decide
who is the real addressee. It means that the Supreme Court would
have just offered a helping hand with respect to court to court
relations. One reason why the I.C.J. does not address any branch of
the federal government specifically is to avoid the invocation of the
doctrine of separation of powers as an excuse. International interest
can be, and should be, pursued through national actions. 76 Interestbalancing in Breard ended up as a dispute between provincialism and
globalization.2' It seems that only Justice Breyer saw no threat in
taking the international proceeding into account, which certainly
merited more careful deliberation. 78
Certain tendencies indicate the rise of a new phenomenon:
An examination of the logical
transjudicial communication."
outcome of globalization shows how comity, as a bridge, being an
exclusive U.S. institution, becomes a new pattern for international
relations on the judicial level. All comity elements are present where
law and policy work together8 0 As U.S. courts are well acquainted
276. See FALK, supra note 157, at 174. According to Falk,
There is a pressing present need for a deeper understanding of certain
common interests among nations-interests so important that they take

precedence over differences in ideology, wealth, culture, and power. The
United States, as a dominant actor with an obvious interest in preserving a

stable

international

environment,

has

a

special

opportunity

and

responsibility to clarify the area of common interests. The settlement of

controversies involving applications of international law in domestic courts
provides the occasion.
Id.
277. See Richardson III, supra note 28, at 121 ("The U.S. actions [in Breard] were
the latest in a series of U.S. assertions of a pretended norm that American

Exceptionalism is superior to international law.").
278. See William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies (Postscript),31 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 257,

322-23 (1998).
279. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Tipology of TransjudicialCommunication, in:
37 (Franck & Fox eds.,

INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS

1996).
280. See Paul, supra note 247, at 6 ("[C]ourts often use comity to relate different
categories of law and policy, for example at the border of law and public policy,
public and private law, domestic and international law, and law and international
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with this doctrine, they should have employed it adequately:
The result strikes an ideal balance between national and
international interests, eschewing the centralizing tendencies of
many public international lawyers (often hand in hand with private
actors enmeshed in globalization processes), while maintaining a
genuine international spiritY'

As an open-ended concept, comity would have enabled the
Breard court to measure the legal and political implications for the
domestic and international actors, and to recognize the decision of
the I.C.J., not out of a sense of obligation, but out of deference.
V. The Character of the Legal Arguments
Breard revealed the bipolarity of international law and its legal
techniques. The adversaries employed arguments stemming from
different legal environments and rhetorics. Given this perspective,
Breard actually showed a deep and systematic disagreement between
international and domestic law. The original approach of both sides
was already in conflict. All other circumstances and developments of
the case simply contributed to the initial discrepancy.
A. The Characterof the United States' Legal Arguments
The United States insisted on an argument that had exclusively
inward validity, based solely on the features of its domestic legal
system. Presenting the case in restrictively domestic scenery, the
emphasis was on the corresponding arguments. The United States
offered an apology to Paraguay as the only possible remedy on the
international plane.'n On the other hand, the criminal offense
committed had an aggravated character with a very strong domestic
interest to punish it. That interest turned out to be the highest value
uncompromisingly protected.
The separation of powers and
federalism allegedly limited the federal government's ability to
interfere efficiently in the resolution of the problem. This shifts the

politics.").
281. Slaughter, supra note 279, at 68.
282. Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Para. v. U.S.),
Oral Pleadings, CR 98/7, para. 3.19 ("The United States contends that the solution to
such a breach of the treaty's requirements is to be pursued through normal processes
of diplomatic apology, consultation and improved implementation."). See also
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9), para. 29.
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issue from federal to state affairs, which is quite surprising for the
U.S.-established allocation of foreign relations powers. Great
deference was given to the domestic presumption of the effects of the
proposed international remedy (status quo ante), which stated that
this would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
Furthermore, the U.S. courts relied heavily on the procedural points
envisaged in the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act, which limited
the right to appeal. This procedural default doctrine caused the
treaty violation (Breard could not remedy the violation of his right
under the treaty due to procedural rules of the forum state). The
United States refused to rectify the procedural impediment to
respond to the international legal request, defending it by the
presumed reasonable diligence of Breard's attorneys. m This was
another domestic presumption that discharged the authority of the
I.C.J. The message of the holding is that the procedural default and
last-in-time rule can defeat an individually based treaty right.'
Arguments before the I.C.J. preserved the same character,
having focused mostly on procedural issues. The interesting point is
that the United States saw the order as focused on the domestic
criminal justice system. Meanwhile, "the [I.C.J.] made it clear that
the case does not concern the right of... states to resort to the death
penalty and that the Court's function is to resolve international legal
disputes between sovereign states and not to act as a universal
Furthermore, the order was
supreme court of criminal appeal."
denied effect due to its allegedly non-binding language and the
procedural default by Paraguay to initiate the procedure before the
283. As Charney and Reisman note,
The Fourth Circuit, however, had earlier rejected the claim that a state's
failure to advise a petitioner of his rights under the Vienna Convention
could constitute cause for failure to raise the claim in state court, because "a

reasonably diligent attorney would have discovered the applicability of the
Vienna Convention to a foreign national defendant."
Charney & Reisman, supra note 101, at 668.
284. Article 36(2) of the Consular Convention provides, "Laws and regulations

must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded ...
are intended." "Applied to Consular Convention claims, the 'default' doctrine would
be inconsistent with such a mandate, since 'full effect' would not be given to the
purposes at stake, which concern the rights to be notified, to communicate and to
have consular assistance." Paust, supra note 81, at 692.

285. Bekker & Highet, supra note 3, at 38.
286. The standard phrase, "to undertake all necessary measures at its disposal,"
was seen as individual and non-binding; the Executive Branch interpreted the

standard restrictively.
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U.N. Security Council for its enforcement.'
The United States
blurred the binding effect and enforceability of the I.C.J. decisions in
this case.
B.

The Character of Paraguay's Legal Arguments

Paraguay strongly advocated genuine international legal
arguments. It insisted that the only possible way to remedy the
violation of the Vienna Convention was to give the order full effect
by granting the stay of Breard's execution. Having claimed the
double international interest-as a state party to treaties at stake, and

as

Breard's

protector-Paraguay

performed

a multiple-treaty

strategy, invoking the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(and its Optional Protocol), the I.C.J. Statute, and the U.N. Charter.
The main clash of arguments referred to the relevance of internal
law to international law. Paraguay argued that domestic law was a
device for the implementation and enforcement of international law.
This deference was not absolute, but functional. It strongly opposed
the international validity of the "procedural default" doctrine not
only because it has an exclusively domestic origin, but also because
"[t]he [I.C.J.], whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to

attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they
might possess in municipal law. ' ' m Therefore, the domestic law
defense is a weak argument, as it cannot be an excuse for noncompliance with international law?

9

It cannot preclude the full effect

of a treaty in internal law, nor can it serve as an excuse for the
287. Paraguay invoked the "enforcement provision" in Article 94(2) of the U.N.
Charter.
288. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 34 (Aug. 30). This holding was repeated in several later cases. See,
e.g., Certain Polish Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger.y v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 6 (Aug. 25); Certain Polish Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits)
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25); Concerning the Northern
Cameroons, (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Dec. 2).
289. Although Paraguay advocated exclusively international legal argument basing
its claims solely on the I.C.J. decisions, it is in accordance with the official statement
of the U.S. State Department. As Franck and Glennon note,
According to the Department of State, article 27 of the Convention on the
law of treaties "restates the long standing principle of customary
international law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." This, the
Department has noted, is "consistent with United States practice over many
years in declining to accept provisions of internal law as justifying nonperformance by a State of its treaty obligations to the United States."
Franck & Glennon, supra note 64, at 284.
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violation of international law.'
Finally, Paraguay's concept of state responsibility reflected a well
established doctrine pertaining to this issue: a sovereign state on the
international plane is the sole subject of international law,
accountable for the acts of all state organs and agencies, as well as for
the acts of its federal units' 9 Having reached the international plane,
Paraguay was not addressing any particular entity within the United

290. The S.S. "Wimbledon," (U.K., Fr., Italy, & Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 1, at 29 (Aug. 17); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1930
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 12 (Dec. 6); Greeco-Bulgarian Communities, 1930 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 17, at 32 (July 31); Fisheries Case, (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. No. 5, at 131
(Dec. 18). This customary international rule was spelled out and codified in Article
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
291. The Draft Articles on the State Responsibility of the UN International Law
Commission, which is considered to be the codification of customary international
law, confirms this rule:
Article 5 (Attribution to the State of the conduct of its organs)
For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State organ
having that status under the internal law of that State shall be
considered as an act of the State concerned under international law,
provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question.
Article 6 (Irrelevance of the position of the organ in the organization of the
State)
The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of
that State under international law, whether that organ belongs to the
constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its
functions are of an international or an internal character, and whether it
holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organization of the
State.
Article 7 (Attribution to the State of the conduct of other entities
empowered to exercise elements of the government authority)
1. The conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a
State shall also be considered as an act of that State under international
law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in
question.
2. The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal
structure of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is
empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity
in the case in question.
Draft Articles on the State Responsibility of the UN International Law Commission,
37 I.L.M. 440 (1998). Roberto Ago, who was a special rapporteur, explained the
exact meaning of the territorial unit, as envisaged in the present Draft Articles. The
territorial unit of the State comprises municipality, province, region, canton, federal
unit, autonomous administration of dependant territory, etc. See Robert Ago, Third
Report on the Responsibility of States, YILCIII, 1976, at 33. For a detailed
discussion of this issue, see Verdross, supra note 215, at 338.
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States' jurisdiction. ' The claim was directed to the United States as a
whole.
"The traditional formal requirements that govern the
presentation of an international claim presuppose a basic deference
to the state as the center of authority."'93
C. The Intersection, Conflict and Reconciliation of the
Different Approaches
The opponents used extreme international and domestic
arguments to defend the values and interests they pursued, presenting
them as the highest values to be protected. Similarly, the arguments
employed were placed on the most remote points of the
individualism-communitarian correlation, which depends on the
values the arguments aim to protect. Every time a state strives to
protect exclusively domestic interests as opposed to international
ones, it takes an individualistic approach, and vice versa. This
opposition can be seen in other contexts as well, such as in the
procedural-substantive or horizontal-vertical perspectives. All these
co-relations comprise internal tension and alienation.
Having followed these patterns, both the United States and
Paraguay deployed techniques different by their legal nature. These
arguments with contrasted origins were not given their full legal effect
in the opposite system and vice versa, which eventually deprived
them of the legal sharpness and effectiveness they pursued. Paraguay
used an extremely international, communitarian, substantive, and
values-based approach, whereas the United States chose an internal,
individualistic, procedural, and self-interest-based attitude.
The difference in strategies is understandable to a certain extent.
Paraguay's interest was identical to the values protected by
international law-consular relations and consuls' functions,
diplomatic protection, international human rights standards, and due
respect for international legal commitments and international courts.
The United States tried to have the issue of exclusive domestic
jurisdiction revisited, as it is exempt from the international
regulation. 4 Therefore, it put forward corresponding arguments
insisting on the criminal justice system, domestic procedural rules, the

292. However, Paraguay analyzed the internal structure and U.S. legal remedies to
a certain extent in order to obtain the provisional measures order. See Richardson
III, supra note 28, at 127.
293. FALK, supra note 157, at 24.
294. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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independence of the courts, and constitutional structural limitations.
Both parties were more focused on the grounds of these arguments
than on the arguments presented by the opposing side, thus, failing to
respond to them directly.
There is only one aspect in which the two parties changed their
domestic-international positions. Paraguay chose a vertical approach,
more concomitant with the structure of the internal legal argument,
whereas the United States advocated the horizontal one. Horizontalvertical dualism is just one of the explanations of the
coordination/subordination features of different legal systems.
Unlike in other instances, the United States insisted on a
communitarian and coordinative approach, implying that consensus is
necessary for every step undertaken on the international plane.
Both arguments were presented to different courts without
substantive changes. Each argument fit well together only with the
court coming from the same legal environment. The values that were
seen as highest before the international courts were not given any
kind of deference in the domestic legal system. Having responded to
the new trends in international law, the I.C.J. has gone further. "For
the first time, the I.C.J. has shown and unanimously accepted a
jurisdictional pathway to assess under international law the fairness of
a verdict by a subfederal unit of a national state about criminal
liability."2' 5 The origin of the principle is old, as established in the
Factory at Chorzow case: "The judgments of domestic courts cannot
invalidate the judgment of an international tribunal."296 The
intersection of these arguments can be clearly seen on the national
level, since countries exist as legal persons on both internal and
international levels, which increases their responsibility in both legal
systems. Reconciliation is usually found in the mid-point of the
conflicting relationship, when opponents try to find arguments that
bridge the gap between the two different concepts and legal systems
where they come from.
Conclusion
This article attempts to show that there were other possible
solutions to the Brearddrama. Most of them could be found in taking
different approaches within the U.S. legal system, since a
295. Richardson HI, supra note 28, at 129.
296. Factory at Chorzow, (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 17, at 33 (July
26).
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considerable part of the case involved many domestic actors. The
U.S. legal system offers many other problem-solution tools and
devices that would have made respect for both domestic and
international law possible in Breard.
The United States used an exclusively domestic argument,
although an international legal argument of domestic origin was at its
disposal. This is the best and most effective argument in the whole
case, as it is the only one able to respond to the demands of both
systems and avoid the conflict between the international and
domestic legal systems.
Either the Court or the executive could have achieved
reconciliation in this manner. The choice actually depends on the
starting viewpoint with respect to the whole problem. If the interestbalancing, policy-oriented, and horizontal approach is perceived as
better 2 9 the executive naturally comes into play, as it falls within the
regular executive function on both the domestic and international
level. On the other hand, the courts might be better able to solve the
problem if the rights-based, vertical approach is thought to be a better
solution. While the executive could perform regular executive
functions, the judiciary might respond to the trend of globalization by
transjudicial communication. Professor Falk referred to this judicial
activism in the analysis of the Sabbatinocase:
It is symbolic because it raises such fundamental issues concerning
the degree of judicial independence in litigation involving rules of
international law. It is also symbolic because the decision reflects
the extent to which domestic courts are prepared to give valid
effect to acts performed by other social systems committed to
values incompatible with their own. Tolerance for incompatible
values is a precondition for harmony in a world composed of
diverse social systems. Judicial awareness of this need for tolerance
is itself an important step in the direction of adapting international
law to changes in international environment. These issues are
present in many contexts of interaction other than Sabbatino. The
reasoning used here is transferable. No decision by the Supreme
Court will settle these problems, for they go the heart of the
management of international conflict in our times.298
The Supreme Court was faced with both horizontal and vertical
aspects of international adjudication. The horizontal aspect appeared

297. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 134, at 679.
298. FALK, supra note 157, at 137-38.
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in the United States' and Paraguay's relationship before and with the
I.C.J., whereas the vertical has come into existence by introducing
Angel Breard to the international context and Paraguay's interest in
that respect. Such complexity left different options for the Court to
deal with this issue. It could have adopted Professor Koh's approach
to international adjudication, which emphasizes the horizontal and
public law approach, introducing political elements in dispute
settlement procedure that inevitably shifts the issue to the executive
branchY* This approach emphasizes that international law deals only
with states as international subjects. On the other hand, this option
can fracture the normative aspects of the domestic/international law
relationship,' making it more political and more difficult for
international law to be implemented in domestic law systems.
However, the Court could have adopted Professor Brilmayer's
approach regarding international adjudication, relying on private
rights and vertical structure, which introduces more legal elements
with parallels in domestic constitutional cases."°1
The United States and Paraguay were both right and wrong in
advocating and developing their arguments. Paraguay was right to
pursue the international law claims, but certain reliance on domestic
law is inevitable, permissible and desirable. On the other hand, such
reliance is not absolute, as the United States explained, but rather
functional.
The discretion of a state is only limited by prohibitive rules.
Every state remains free to adopt principles that it regards as best and
most suitable. All that can be required of a state is that it not
overstep the limits that international law places upon its jurisdiction.
Within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its
sovereignty.'
The countermajoritarian difficulty seems to have arisen in this
case-Congress stayed silent regarding the Breardincident, although
the particular decision of the I.C.J. relied upon an international treaty
299. See generally Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating
Terrorism Through TransnationalPublic Law Litigation,22 TEx. INT'L L. 3. 169, 200
(1987); HAROLD H. KOH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE IMPORTER STATE IN
TRANSFERRING
HAZARDOUS
TECHNOLOGIES
AND
SUBSTANCES:
THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE 170,194 (G. Handl & R. Lutz eds., 1989); Koh,
supra note 68. For further commentary, see Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2313-14.
300. See Franck & Fox, supra note 154, at 5.

301. See Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 2312-14.
302. See S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10, at 19.
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to which the United States is a party. However, the Supreme Court
did not respect Congress' will in that respect.
The question of who the addressee was has been answered. The
I.C.J. neither could nor wanted to address the domestic courts
directly. The I.C.J. addressed the nation as a whole, and if one really
wishes to identify the most suitable addressee, even in the eyes of the
I.C.J., the executive appears to be it. The vertical approach to the
problem involves a possible jurisdictional overlap, and "where such
an incompatible overlap is discerned, the most effective modes of
adjustment appear to be strongly horizontal in character. ' Still, it
need not be the relationship of conflict, as the activism of the
American courts can always introduce transjudicial communication
by being responsive to the holdings of the World Court.
The political implications of Breard are obvious. Apart from the
deterioration of the United States' international reputation and its
diplomatic relations with Paraguay, the case indicated the undesirable
tendency confirmed in LaGrand,pending before the I.C.J. Domestic
citizens may find themselves denied access to consular services in
foreign countries where U.S. diplomatic protests will certainly have
less legitimacy and persuasiveness. In addition, the U.S. position in
seeking remedies before the I.C.J. in future cases may deteriorate due
to the manifest disrespect for this institution. "A reputation for
playing fast and loose with treaty commitments can only do harm to
our capacity to be a leader in the post-Cold War world."'
International law heavily relies upon national legal systems and
courts. Nations should try to develop better arguments for obeying
international law, taking into account common international interests
and globalization as an ongoing and beneficial process. National
courts should defer to international law, or at least take a more
considerate approach when dealing with both national and
international interests. Such deference is not only beneficial for the
international courts, but for state members as well. An effective
international legal order should be seen as not only important per se,
but also as essential for the states themselves when pursuing their
individual interests.

303. FALK, supra note 157, at 27 (emphasis in original).
304. Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 462
(1998).

